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Death, Drugs and Development:
Malaysia's Mandatory Death Penalty




If the Bush administration is engaged in a "war on drugs" in 1991
and the "drug war" has become a common way to characterize a mas-
sive package of legal measures to eradicate (or at least reduce) drug
use, then it may be said that Malaysia began its drug war in 1975
when it first prescribed the death penalty for drug trafficking.1 In
1983, it made the death penalty for trafficking in drugs mandatory.2
* Professor of Law, City University of New York Law School at Queens College and the
Graduate Center, CUNY. B.A., Malacaster College; M.S., J.D., Ph.D., University of Wiscon-
sin (Madison). The research for this article was done in 1989-90 while the author was a Ful-
bright Visiting Professor at the Faculty of Law and Administration of Institut Teknologi
MARA, Shah Alam, Malaysia. The author wishes to acknowledge the helpful comments of
faculty and students at Institut Teknologi MARA but accepts sole responsibility for the con-
clusions herein.
1. Dangerous Drugs (Amendment) Act, 1975, § 39B, Act A293 (Malaysia) [hereinafter
1975 Act], amending Dangerous Drug Act 1952, Act 234 (Malaysia) [hereinafter 1952 Act].
It should be understood that the level of substantive justice in Malaysia is the equal of that in
the United States. If anything, this study illustrates more significant parallels than differences.
It is important, therefore, not to take criticisms of particular aspects of the Malaysian criminal
justice system out of this context.
2. Dangerous Drugs (Amendment) Act, 1983, § 39B, Act A553/83 (Malaysia) [hereinaf-
ter 1983 Act], amending 1952 Act, supra note 1. For a complete history of Amendments to
the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1952, see Majid, Amendments to the Dangerous Drugs Act, 1952,
15 JURNAL UNDANG-UNDANG/JOURNAL OF MALAYSIAN AND COMPARATIVE LAW 131
(1988).
Since 1975, nearly three hundred persons have been sentenced to death for trafficking; by
June, 1990 about one hundred persons had been hanged. Winning Edge in War Against
Dadah, New Straits Times [hereinafter NST], June 28, 1990, at 9, col. 1. "Dadah" is the
Malaysian word for opiate-based narcotics. Hundreds more suspected traffickers are currently
detained without trial under a related measure, the Dangerous Drugs (Special Preventive
Measures) Act, which is aimed specifically at traffickers who cannot be criminally convicted
because of a lack of evidence. See Dangerous Drugs (Special Preventive Measures) Act, 1985,
Act 316 (Malaysia) [hereinafter SPM Act].
All statistics in this article are from the Malaysian English-language press, primarily the
NST, the country's major daily newspaper. Official statistics concerning crime, police, and
prisons are not published in Malaysia and are difficult to get from official sources. The NST is
owned by the dominant United Malays National Organization Party (UMNO), and it has both
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Malaysia's mandatory death penalty for trafficking and the
extensive system of emergency provisions that supports the penalty
raise many questions that have never been the subject of critical schol-
arly analysis. To include drug offenses among the most serious crimes
is problematic, given the clear linkages between drug use and other
social problems, 3 and the fact that, regardless of the penalties pre-
scribed, it is clear that drug trafficking is difficult, if not impossible, to
control.4 For lawyers, Malaysia's war on drugs poses a serious threat
to many fundamental ideals inherent in the rule of the law, such as
the presumption of innocence and the importance of due process.'
The impact of Malaysia's mandatory death penalty merits study,
not only because Malaysia has held itself out to the world as an exam-
ple of a country that is tough on drugs,6 but because of the significant
effect the large number of drug cases and appeals7 have on the devel-
opment of Malaysian criminal law and procedure. Moreover, Ameri-
cans have been told that Malaysia's laws may be tough, but they
work.8 As American policy-makers face their own losing war on
drugs and turn to more draconian approaches, 9 how well Malaysia's
drug laws work could have significant policy implications for the
United States.
a highly professional standard of journalism, and access to official sources. Hence it may be
regarded as an accurate source of both official statistics and official viewpoints. A request by
the author for official statistics on arrests, trials, imprisonments, and executions under the
Dangerous Drugs Act received no response.
3. There is substantial literature on the social meaning of drug use and of societal efforts
to repress drug use. See generally D. MUsTO, THE AMERICAN DISEASE: ORIGINS OF NAR-
COTIC CONTROL (expanded ed. 1987); S. WIsoTsKY, BREAKING THE IMPASSE IN THE WAR
ON DRUGS (1986); J. KAPLAN, THE HARDEST DRUG: HEROIN AND PUBLIC POLICY (1983);
T. SzASz, CEREMONIAL CHEMISTRY: THE RITUAL PERSECUTION OF DRUGS, ADDICTS, AND
PUSHERS (1983); D. COURTWRIGHT, DARK PARADISE: OPIATE ADDICTION IN AMERICA
BEFORE 1940 (1982).
4. There is no evidence that enforcement efforts have reduced drug consumption in any
Western country. In the United States, anti-drug laws resemble the prohibition against alcohol
of the 1920s, which was ineffective and undermined the criminal law. See generally L GUS-
FIELD, SYMBOLIC CRUSADE: STATUS POLITICS AND THE AMERICAN TEMPERANCE MOVE-
MENT (2d ed. 1986); T. DUSTER, THE LEGISLATION OF MORALITY: LAWS, DRUGS, AND
MORAL JUDGMENT (1972); J. KAPLAN, MARIJUANA-THE NEW PROHIBITION (1970).
5. Note that there is no "cruel and unusual punishment" provision in the Malaysian
constitution, hence there are no constitutional limitations on the imposition of the death pen-
alty in Malaysia. FEDERAL CONST. arts. 5-13 (Malaysia) (relating to fundamental liberties).
6. See infra note 32.
7. See infra notes 225-230 and accompanying text and table.
8. American support for Malaysia's anti-drug policies is discussed in the context of the
trafficking charges against an American citizen in Kaplan, The Noose for An American?,
NEWSWEEK, Oct. 15, 1990, at 42.
9. President Bush, in a recent speech, proclaimed "death for drug kingpins," and then
drug "czar" William Bennett drafted a strategy calling for the death penalty for drug kingpins.
More Want Death Penalty in the US, NST, April 8, 1990, at 14, col. 1.
[29:365
MALAYSIA'S MANDATORY DEATH PENALTY
This article discusses Malaysian court rulings on the death pen-
alty and the host of drug-related laws that the Malaysian Parliament
has passed to accompany the penalty. I argue that the mandatory
death penalty has not served the deterrent effect the Malaysian and
other governments had conceived it might. Instead, the Malaysian
courts have developed numerous exceptions to the penalty, exceptions
that may have led to a counter-balancing increase in arrests on drug
charges by the Malaysian police.
Section I of this article discusses the social background in Malay-
sia against which the drug legislation was enacted. Section II details
the existing drug laws in order to show the place of the mandatory
death penalty for drug trafficking in the Malaysian legal order. See-
tion III analyzes the treatment of the death penalty and its accompa-
nying statutory presumptions by the courts. Section IV discusses how
the handling of drug cases by the police has influenced the develop-
ment of the drug laws. Section V examines the statistics of mandatory
death penalty enforcement in order to determine whether the penalty
has been an effective deterrent. I conclude by arguing that Malaysia's
drug war has not succeeded in preventing heightened drug use in the
country, but suggest that an equilibrium has been reached between
the legal and political systems which has resulted in far fewer actual
executions than might have been the case in a country with a legal
system less firmly rooted in traditional due process notions.
II. THE SOCIAL CONTEXT OF MALAYSIAN DRUG LAWS
Since gaining its independence in 1957, Malaysia has been in vir-
tually continuous states of emergency. At first, these were instituted
to provide the government legal means to combat communist insur-
gents. l° In recent years, however, emergency measures have been
aimed at a wide range of critics of the government, including Chris-
tian activists, Muslim fundamentalists, trade union leaders, opposi-
tion party leadership, academics, native tribal leaders and
environmentalists. 1 In October 1987, leaders of many of these
10. There are a number of studies of the communist insurgency in Malaya, which was
the official name for Malaysia until 1963. See generally A. SHORT, THE COMMUNIST INSUR-
RECTION IN MALAYA, 1948-1960 (1975); B. KHENG CHEAH, RED STAR OVER MALAYA:
RESISTANCE AND SOCIAL CONFLICT DURING AND AFTER THE JAPANESE OCCUPATION
(1983).
Emergency measures are so much a part of current government policy that the December
1989 surrender of the Communist Party of Malaysia had no impact at all on the emergency
measures. See Aznam, Farewell to Arms, FAR EASTERN ECONOMIC REvIEw, Dec. 14, 1989,
at 36.
11. See generally R. MILNE & D. MAUZY, POLITICS AND GOVERNMENT IN MALAYSIA
(2d ed. 1986); G.P. MEANS, MLAYSIAN POLITICS (2d ed. 1976). For a full legal analysis of
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groups were detained, some for up to two years, under the Internal
Security Act (ISA). 12  Detentions were based on the flimsiest of
charges, none having any relationship to the communist emergency.' 3
The use of a mandatory death penalty has been an important element
of these emergency measures, and currently there are seventeen
offenses punishable by death,' 4 including possession of a firearm or
bullet'5 and using a gun to commit an offense.1 6
Owing to its geographical position immediately to the south of
the "Golden Triangle"-the drug production area of Burma, Laos
and Thailand-Malaysia is a potential center for a major portion of
the drug trade.'7 Malaysia is also a major user nation with a very
high rate of drug addiction. Historically, Malaysia's drug use is
rooted in the Chinese community's use of opium, which was sanc-
tioned and taxed by the British during its colonial rule over Malay-
sia.' Addiction spread into the Malay and Indian communities and
emergency powers in Malaysia, see Jayakumar, Emergency Powers in Malaysia: Development
of the Law, 1957-1977 [1978] MALAYAN L.J. ix.
12. The Internal Security Act, 1960, Act 82 (Malaysia) [hereinafter ISA], is a copy of a
British Colonial law which authorizes emergency powers such as detention without due pro-
cess. There is a substantial body of Malaysian law on the ISA. In general, courts have consist-
ently upheld the Act on the grounds that Parliament has plenary power in such areas. There is
also a constitutional provision specifically granting wide internal security powers to the King
in Parliament. FEDERAL CONST. arts. 149, 150 (Malaysia).
13. See generally COMMITTEE AGAINST REPRESSION IN ASIA AND THE PACIFIC
(CARPA), TANGLED WEB: DISSENT, DETERRENCE, AND THE 27 OCTOBER CRACKDOWN IN
MALAYSIA (1988); DEMOCRATIC ACTION PARTY, THE REAL REASON: OPERATION LAL-
LANG ISA ARRESTS, OCT. 27, 1987 (1988) (brief submitted to the Inter-Parliamentary Union
Mission to investigate the violation of human rights of Malaysian Parliamentarians). Both
these sources are published by the political opposition, and their viewpoints are widely
accepted abroad. See, eg., THE EUROPEAN COMMrITEE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS IN MALAYSIA
AND SINGAPORE, THE RULE OF LAW AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN MALAYSIA AND SINGAPORE
(1989). Only five months after the October detentions, the Ministry of Home Affairs published
a white Paper entitled "Towards Preserving National Security" defending its actions.
CARPA, supra, at 36.
14. Weng Kwai, Should The Death Penalty Be Abolished? [1981] MALAYSIAN CURRENT
L.J. 25, 27-28.
15. ISA, supra note 12, § 57 (being in unlawful possession of firearms or ammunition in
any security area [currently, the entire nation is denominated such a security area]); Id. § 58,
(for consorting with a person in unlawful possession of firearms or ammunition); Id. § 59
(offenses relating to military supplies).
16. Penal Code, F.M.S. Cap. 45, § 121 (1988) (Malaysia) (waging or attempting to wage
war against the King, ruler, or governor); id. § 121A, (offenses against the person of the King);
id. § 132, (abetment of mutiny, if mutiny committed in consequence).
17. Perhaps 80% of America's heroin comes from this area. Southeast Asia is Now No. 1
Source of US Heroin, N. Y. TIMES, Feb. 11, 1990, at 6, col. 1. On the origin of the Southeast
Asian heroin trade, see generally A. MCCOY, THE POLITICS OF HEROIN IN SOUTHEAST ASIA
(1972); C.P. SPENCER & V. NAVARATNAM, DRUG ABUSE IN EAST ASIA (1981); Going After
Asia's Drug Lord, AIAWEEK, June 1, 1990, at 23.
18. C.P. SPENCER, DRUG ABUSE IN EAST ASIA 8-26 (1981); E. SADKA, THE PRO-
TECTED MALAY STATES, 1874-1895, at 298-99, 309, 331-36 (1968). On the history of Chinese
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became a major national problem in the 1970s and 1980s. The tradi-
tion of Chinese opium smoking was officially ignored, but the arrival
of a western-type, youth-culture drug problem was offensive to many
Malaysians, 19 particularly the fundamentalist Muslims.20 As a result,
strong anti-drug measures became popular with the Malay
electorate.21
Currently, Malaysia has 140,000 "registered" addicts.2 2 Since
registration exposes a person to involuntary commitment to a prison-
like rehabilitation center,23 many addicts choose not to register; it is
criminal gangs in Malaysia and their close historical linkages with the opium trade, see gener-
ally L.F. COMBER, CHINESE SECRET SOCIETIES IN MALAYA: A SURvEY OF THE TRIAD
SOCIETY FROM 1800 TO 1900 (1959). See also Joint Report on the Traffic In Opium and Other
Dangerous Drugs for the Calendar Year 1937, (file No. 1304) (available at Sabah State
Archives, Kota Kinabalu); C. TRoCiu, OPIUM AND EMPIRE: CHINESE SOCIETY IN COLONIAL
SINGAPORE, 1800-1910 (1991).
19. While almost all drug traffickers arrested in the 1970s and early 1980s were Chinese,
many arrested in the late 1980s were Malay. In 1989, for the first time, the number of Malays
tried in reported cases roughly equalled the number of Chinese. This estimate is based on the
author's review of the ethnicity of surnames in the cases, a technique basically reliable in
Malaysia because Malays, Chinese and Indians have distinct naming customs.
20. C. MUzAFFAR, infra note 28, at 1-28. The Malaysian government is secular, liquor
is freely available and a gambling casino flourishes in the center of the country, but strong anti-
drug measures appeal to Islamic fundamentalists. Other more explicitly Islamic legislation
executed on behalf of the fundamentalists makes rigorous religious education compulsory for
Muslim students through the university level.
21. Shivadas, More Want Death Penalty in the US, NST, Apr. 8, 1990, at 14. The article
provides an elaborate defense of Malaysia's death penalty laws:
Malaysia has been attacked by do-gooders in other countries who suggest that
because we have these so-called draconian laws economic assistance should be cur-
tailed .... If human rights are being curtailed it is only of criminals .... The death
penalty for dadah traffickers and those in possession of firearms for no other purpose
than to commit terrorism or crime had been an intrinsic part of the Malaysian legal
fabric borne [sic] out of necessity-the days of the Emergency (1948-1960) and the
subsequent emergency of human degradation through dadah addiction. Our leaders
have had to act quickly and decisively. Although there should be respect for the
rights of an individual, a government has to work on the basis of the good of the
majority.
Id.
Majid, Administration of Criminal Justice, reprinted in SURVEY OF MALAYSIAN LAW 176
(V. Sinnadurai ed. 1985) provides an academic's endorsement for the anti-drug measures:
The spirit of the Dangerous Drugs Act is indeed noble. No one would argue that
anyone who is involved with dangerous drugs should escape punishment on the
ground of inadequacies or technicalities of the law. Such person should be punished
with death.
Id. at 177.
22. Addicts Spend $900 Million on Dadah, NST, Jan. 7, 1990, at 3.
23. Drug Dependents (Treatment and Rehabilitation) Act 1983, Act 83 (Malaysia)
[hereinafter Drug Dependents Act]. The Act provides for the registration of addicts and for
the involuntary commitment of addicts to tightly controlled and disciplined residential treat-
ment programs in guarded centers surrounded by walls. Detention for a period of up to two
years can be authorized by any magistrate. Id. § 6(l)(a). Addicts may also be placed under
1991]
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estimated that for every registered addict there must be at least two
who do not register.24 If these data are correct, Malaysia has one of
the world's largest per capita populations of drug addicts and users, a
possibility vehemently denied by the government, but supported by its
own official statistics.25
Malaysia's social fabric plays a role in the national perception of
the drug crisis. Despite official denials, Malaysia is an intensely
polarized society with serious racial, class and religious divisions.2 s
The population is composed of three major ethnic groups: Malay
(53%); Chinese (36%); and Indian, predominantly Tamil (11%).27
Malays, by law, are Muslim, and Islam is the state religion.28 The
current government-a coalition of Indian, Chinese and Malay par-
ties-is led by the United Malays' National Organization (UMNO)
Party. In addition to this diverse ethnic and political mix, there are
wide class divisions.
29
In addition to their religious objections to drug use, Malaysians
also have concerns about the effect drug use might have on national
development. For example, one official publication states: "As a
developing country committed to a modem and dynamic society,
Malaysia can hardly afford a young generation debilitated by drugs.
Her objective is to inculcate in her youths an automatic revulsion
the supervision of a rehabilitation officer for a minimum of two years. Id. § 6(l)(b). The
government concedes that these rehabilitation programs are not effective and that perhaps
80% of all those released return to drugs. Teaching Rehabilitation Center Inmates Better
Skills, Star, March 23, 1990, at 14; Rise in Number of Dadah Addicts Last Year, NST, March
17, 1990, at 9; A Ding-Dong Anti-dadah War, NST, Jan. 9, 1990, at 10.
24. Hanging for Dadah, but Cheers for Cigarettes, UTUSAN KONSUMER, Feb., 1990, at
15.
25. Id. The article reports that there are one-half million drug users in Malaysia. The
New York Times reports that the United States has one-half million users of heroin and six
million users of cocaine. Southeast Asia Is Now No. 1 Source of US Heroin, NST, Feb. 11, 1990,
at 6, col. 4. Assuming that Malaysia's user population is closer to one-half million, such an
estimate would give Malaysia approximately the same per capita drug user population as the
United States.
26. In fact, the government is so intent on such denial that it may be illegal to allege that
there are such divisions. Section 73(2) of the ISA reads: "Any police officer may without
warrant arrest and detain... any person.., who the officer suspects has acted or is about to
act in any manner prejudicial to the security of Malaysia... or to the maintenance of essential
services therein or to the economic life thereof." ISA, supra note 12, § 73(2).
27. L. COMBER, 13 MAY 1969: A HISTORICAL SURVEY OF SINO-MALAY RELATIONS 89
(1983).
28. See C. MUZAFFAR, ISLAMIC RESURGENCE IN MALAYSIA 1-12 (1987).
29. See generally K.S. JOMO, A QUESTION OF CLASS: CAPITAL, THE STATE, AND UNE-
VEN DEVELOPMENT IN MALAYA (1989); K.S. JOMO, MAHATHIR'S ECONOMIC POLICIES (2d
ed. 1989); K.K. SOONG, POLARIZATION IN MALAYSIA: THE ROOT CAUSES (1987); M. AMIN &
M. CALDWELL, MALAYA: THE MAKING OF A NEO-COLONY (1977). For a discussion provid-
ing great insight into patterns of change and conffict in a rural Malay village, see generally J.
SCOTT, WEAPONS OF THE WEAK (1988).
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toward drugs."' 30 Prime Minister Dr. Mahathir bin Mohamed, draw-
ig a parallel with Latin American and other Southeast Asian coun-
tries, has also stated that the magnitude of drug use has led to a
"security problem with implications for the country's continued via-
bility and the maintenance of its national sovereignty." 31 Thus,
Malaysia, at least in its own eyes, has become the one country willing
to take a stand against drugs.32
III. DRUG LEGISLATION IN MALAYSIA
Section 39B of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1952 (1952 Act) pro-
vides for mandatory death for trafficking in drugs33 and is the most
significant single piece of a series of legislative efforts designed to con-
trol illegal drug use in Malaysia. In addition, five other drug control
acts have been passed, all of which have been amended numerous
times.34
30. FEDERAL MINISTRY OF INFORMATION, MALAYSIA'S STAND ON DRUG ABUSE
WELL ACCEPTED 6 (1987).
31. Id. at 24.
32. This was effectively underscored when, despite protests from the governments of
Australia and Great Britain, Malaysia hanged Kevin Barlow and Brian Chambers in July 1986
for trafficking. This action portrayed Malaysia as a small country unafraid to stand up to
major western powers. The Barlow-Chambers case focused world attention on Malaysia's
drugs laws. Public Prosecutor v. Barlow and Chambers [1986] MALAYAN L.J. 104 (S.C.
Kuala Lumpur 1985). For an account of this case see At the Eleventh Hour, ASIAWEEK, July
6, 1986, at 22; Dust to Dust, ASIAWEEK, July 20, 1986, at 52. To summarize their case briefly,
Kevin Barlow and Brian Chambers, both Australian citizens, were arrested at Penang Airport
for possessing 180 grams of heroin. The drugs were in Chambers's bag, carried by Barlow.
Both denied knowledge of the drug, but failed to offer any explanation for its presence. They
were convicted of trafficking and hanged. The two were among the first convicted under the
mandatory death penalty provisions of section 39B of the 1952 Act. Barlow's mother wrote an
account of the case, B. BARLoW, A LONG WAY FROM HOME (1988).
In addition to the Barlow-Chambers case, the election of Prime Minister Mahathir as
Chairman of the International Conference on Drug Abuse and Illicit Trafficking held in
Vienna was the culmination of a major effort by the Malaysian government to promote its
tough drug policies internationally. According to one analysis, Prime Minister Mahathir
Mohamed actively sought out the chair of this organization to create a higher international
profile for Malaysia's anti-drug efforts, in order to counteract adverse international publicity
following from his increased domestic repression. CARPA, supra note 13, at xiv.
33. 1952 Act, supra note 1, § 39B(2).
34. These include the Dangerous Drugs Regulations of 1952, Law No. 555 (Malaysia);
the Poisons Ordinance of 1952, Law No. 29 (Malaysia); the Drug Dependant's (Treatment and
Rehabilitation) Act, 1983, Act 283 (Malaysia); the SPM Act, supra note 2; and the Dangerous
Drugs (Forfeiture of Property) Act, 1988, Act 340 (Malaysia).
Some idea of how complex (and confusing) this arsenal of laws is can be gleaned from the
fact that the 1952 Act has been amended nineteen times since 1952-seventeen times since
1971. A complete listing of the amendments to the 1952 Act can be found in Majid, supra note
2. The account of these amendments which follows relies largely on Majid's thorough
research.
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The drug acts' many amendments were adopted with little Par-
liamentary debate because the governing UNMO coalition holds a
commanding majority in Parliament 35 and the passage of its most
important legislative measures is, consequently, routine. Although
some Malaysian legal commentators have proposed that the various
measures be consolidated into one act, the government is satisfied
with its existing drug measures.36
Intense legislative activity has created a haphazard and reactive
set of drug laws. However, these laws clearly reveal three trends.
First, whenever penalties have been changed, they have been
increased. Second, there has been a consistent trend to relax the
traditional due process standards of Malaysian law as they apply to
drug defendants. This has been true to such an extent that detainees
under the Dangerous Drugs (Special Preventive Measures) Act (SPM
Act), as amended in 1990, have no recourse to the courts at all.
Rather, they are simply detained for up to two years on the order of
the Home Minister, who is currently the Prime Minister.37 There are
also special provisions for searches and arrests without warrants, 38
ready admission of "cautioned statements" to police officers,39 use of
agents-provocateurs, 40 and a complex system of presumptions which
has the effect of shifting a part of the burden of proof in a trafficking
case to the accused.41 Third, the Malaysian government has consist-
ently tried to make its legal arsenal against dangerous drugs among
the world's strongest. In addition to the mandatory death penalty
provisions of Section 39B, there are mandatory whippings, 2 forced
35. The UNMO Coalition held 148 of the 177 Parliament seats as of August 1990.
36. Drug Laws are Tough Enough. Megat Junid, NST, Mar. 22, 1990, at 3.
One Malaysian legal scholar has observed, there is a "scissors and paste.., cut and
patch" quality to the body of drug laws that undermines their effectiveness:
Now more and more nations having drugs problems are following our models in
dealing with drug offenses, i.e., by imposing a death penalty. But when they look at
the cobweb surrounding our untidy drug laws, the first impression is always cast
upon the lawmakers .... Let us do some housekeeping to consolidate all our drug
laws into one simple code .... This is also to ensure that our students, teachers,
police officers, lawyers, prosecutors and defence counsels, judges, the press, the lay-
men and the foreigners who are looking forward to us[ing] our law as a model will
find our drug laws neat, clean and tidy.
Majid, supra note 21, at 78.
37. SPM Act, supra note 2, § 6(l). In theory, detainees have a few rights under the
statute, but these are frequently unenforced. For example, a detainee has the right to receive a
written list of allegations. Since there is no judicial review, however, a detainee has no way to
compel the production of such a list.
38. 1952 Act, supra note 1, § 31A(l).
39. Id. § 37A.
40. Id. § 40A(l).
41. Id. § 37.
42. Id. § 39A.
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rehabilitation in detention camps,4 3 and preventive detention under
provisions approximating those of the ISA.4
A. The Dangerous Drugs Acts
The original 1952 Malaysian drug enactment, the 1952 Act, con-
solidated the existing drug laws from the individual Malay states.4 5
The Dangerous Drugs (Amendment) Act of 1975 (1975 Act)"
was the first of many amendments to the 1952 Act, and completely
reorganized the law to provide the framework that exists today. The
most important change was the addition of section 39B, providing
that trafficking in dangerous drugs would be punishable by death, life
imprisonment, whipping, or some combination of those penalties.47
The 1975 Act also increased sentences for possession of opium,
requiring a mandatory whipping of at least three strokes if the opium
weighed more than 250 grams.48
A new section of the 1975 Act, Section 37B, permitted the deten-
tion of addicts for treatment.4 9 It also made "cautioned statements"
given to ordinary police or customs officers admissible at trial, a pro-
vision that violated existing due process standards in Malaysian law.50
Sessions Courts were given the power to impose all penalties under
the Acts except death, which reduced the burden of the large number
of drug cases on the High Court. 1
43. Drug Dependents Act, supra note 23, § 6.
44. SPM Act, supra note 2, §§ 3-6A.
45. To facilitate colonial control, the British created a fiction that Malaysian states were
independent sultanates functioning under nominal British "resident advisors." Thus, each
state had its own code of laws. Beginning in the 1930s these codes were increasingly central-
ized under a "Federated Malay States" government that included a single system of courts.
See generally R. BRADDELL, THE LEGAL STATUS OF THE MALAY STATES (1937).
46. See supra note 1.
47. The maximum sentence under the 1952 Act had previously been five years imprison-
ment. Majid, supra note 2, at 135.
Section 39A prohibits drug possession. 1952 Act, supra note 1, § 39A. Prior to the crea-
tion of § 39B prohibiting drug trafficking, section 39A established the major drug offense in
Malaysia. Section 39A prosecutions still far outnumber section 39B prosecutions, and are
primarily for the possession of smaller amounts of drugs than trigger section 39B "trafficking"
presumptions. Rise in Number of Dadah Addicts Last Year, NST, March 17, 1990, at 9. In
1989 there were 688 arrests under section 39B and 950 arrests under section 39A. Id.
48. 1975 Act, supra note 1, § 9.
49. Id. § 37B.
50. Id. § 37A. Only police officers at the rank of Inspector or above may take these so-
called "cautioned statements" under Malaysian law. M.K. MAJID, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE IN
MALAYSIA 68 (1987).
51. Dangerous Drugs (Amendment) (No. 2) Act, 1975, § 41A, Act A318 (Malaysia),
amending 1952 Act, supra note 1. Malaysia's national court system is four tiered. At the
lowest level are Magistrates that hear minor matters. Above Magistrates are the Sessions
Courts that are the primary courts for both civil and criminal matters. The High Courts serve
1991]
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The Amendment of 1977 (1977 Act)52 provided for the first in a
series of statutory presumptions establishing some elements of the
offense of trafficking. 53 The 1977 Act deemed possession of 100 grams
of heroin or morphine, an amount later amendments reduced to fif-
teen grams,54 200 grams of cannabis or resin, 1,000 grams of prepared
opium, or five kilograms of raw opium enough to prove an intent to
traffick.55 It also provided for a broader definition of trafficking and
permitted the use of testimony of agents provocateurs without corrob-
oration in trafficking cases.56
The presumptions now contained in the Malaysian drug laws are
important aids to the State, even though the burden of establishing
proof beyond a reasonable doubt remains on the prosecution.57 In all,
there are ten presumptions set out in Section 37, but only a few of
them are commonly used.58 Section 37(b) provides that a person is
the occupier of the premises if he has "care and management" of the
premises. Section 37(d), the most frequently used presumption, pro-
vides that "any person who is found to have had in his custody or
under his control anything whatsoever containing any dangerous drug
shall... be deemed to have possession of such drug and shall... be
deemed to have known the nature of such drug."' 9 Section 37(f)
presumes that the master of a ship or aircraft has knowledge of any
drugs imported on such ship or aircraft." Section 37(g) provides that
if any dangerous drug is concealed on any premises it is presumed to
be with the knowledge of the occupier of the premises.6 1
The state's burden of proof was also reduced by the adoption of a
definition of "trafficking" which includes possession.62 This definition
both as intermediate courts of appeal and also as first instance trial courts for major civil and
criminal cases, including all death penalty cases. The Supreme Court, while having limited
jurisdiction to hear cases of first instance, is basically appellate. Outside this hierarchy, but
integrated within this system, are native and shariah (muslim religious) courts. T.M. Su L&N,
INTRODUCTION TO THE MALAYSIAN LEGAL SYSTEM 56-88 (1988).
52. Dangerous Drugs (Amendment) (No. 2) Act, 1977, Act A390 (Malaysia), amending
1952 Act, supra note 1.
53. Id. § 37.
54. Id. § 37(da).
55. Id.
56. Id. §§ 2, 40A.
57. M.K. MAJID, supra note 50, at 186.
58. See infra section IV.B. for a discussion of how these presumptions work in the
courts.
59. 1952 Act, supra note 1, § 37(d).
60. Id. § 37(f).
61. Id. § 37(g).
62. Trafficking includes "manufacturing, importing, exporting, keeping, concealing, buy-
ing, selling, giving, receiving, storing, administering, transporting, carrying, sending, deliver-
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essentially eliminates any difference in the criminal liability of users
and dealers.63
Restrictions of traditional due process continued with the Dan-
gerous Drugs (Amendment) Act of 1978, which provided for the
automatic elimination of bail for all offenses providing for more than
five years' imprisonment under the Act" and the elimination of bail
for lesser offenses on the Public Prosecutor's written certification that
it is "not in the public interest to grant bail" to the accused.65 Thus,
even for defendants possessing small amounts of drugs, bail may be
denied.66
The Dangerous Drugs (Amendment) Act of 1983 provided for
the mandatory death penalty for trafficking under section 39B. 67
Moreover, it sharply reduced amounts in possession required to
invoke the presumption of trafficking.68
The quantities of drug possession at which the government may
impose severe penalties, including life imprisonment in some
instances, were reduced again under Section 39A of the Dangerous
ing, procuring, supplying, or distributing any dangerous drug." Id. § 2 (definition of
trafficking).
As a result of this definition and the presumption set forth in the preceding paragraph of
text, by simply proving that a defendant is (a) the captain of a ship, and (b) that the ship
carried more than fifteen grams of heroin, the prosecution has technically met its burden of
proof on a charge of trafficking under section 39B, exposing the defendant to the mandatory
death sentence and leaving the defendant with the burden of rebutting the presumption. This
result would follow from the presumptions in sections 37(f) and 37(b).
63. Malaysian courts have recognized this fact and been troubled by it. The beginnings
of a judicial remedy have been constructed through an affirmative "personal use" defense
against trafficking charges. See Cohen Lorraine Philis v. Public Prosecutor [1989] MALAY-
siAN CuRRENT L.J. 956 (S.C. Kuala Lumpur) discussed in infra text accompanying notes 171-
176.
64. Dangerous Drugs (Amendment) Act, 1978, § 41B, Act 426/78 (Malaysia) [hereinaf-
ter 1978 Act], amending 1952 Act, supra note 1. For examples of the court's application of
§ 41B, see Loy Chin Hei v. Public Prosecutor [1982] MALAYSiAN CuRRer L.J. 37 (H.C.
Melaka 1981); Public Prosecutor v. Chew Siew Luan [1982] MALAYAN L.J. 119 (F.C. Penang
1982).
65. 1978 Act, supra note 64, § 41B(c).
66. These provisions are in conflict with the Criminal Procedure Code which provides
that virtually all criminal defendants have a right to bail. Criminal Procedure Code (Amend-
ment and Extension Act), 1976, § 387, Act A324 (Malaysia). The Federal Court has held that
the Dangerous Drugs Act superseded the Criminal Procedure Code, thereby denying those
charged under the Dangerous Drugs Act the right to bail. Public Prosecutor v. Chew Siew
Luan [1982] MALAYAN L.J. 119 (F.C. Penang 1982).
67. 1983 Act, supra note 2, § 39B.
68. Id. § 39A. The Dangerous Drugs (Amendment) Act, 1984, added the possession of
fifteen grams of monacetylmorphines to this list, and also specified various combinations of
drugs that activated the presumption of trafficking. Dangerous Drugs (Amendment) Act,
1984, §§ 37(da), 37A, Act A596 (Malaysia), amending 1952 Act, supra note 1.
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Drugs (Amendment) Act of 1986.69 In addition, the punishment of
mandatory whipping for everyone convicted under the Act was added
as a penalty, replacing the optional sentence of whipping that had
already been provided.7"
B. The Special Preventive Measures Act
While the 1952 Act and its amendments gave the state extensive
legal powers to control trafficking, the government felt that it needed
additional laws to control drug trafficking. Therefore, in 1985 the
government extended the ISA to drug trafficking cases, so that traf-
fickers against whom there is no evidence sufficient to proceed with a
formal criminal trial can nevertheless be detained.71 The SPM Act
also allows routine re-arrests of trafficking defendants who were
acquitted by the courts.72
The procedures for detention under the SPM Act allow any
police officer, without a warrant, to detain any person whom he has
reasonable grounds to suspect for a period of up to twenty-four
hours.73 Subsequently, a police officer of Deputy Superintendent rank
or higher may order further detention for up to sixty days.74 During
this period the police may interrogate the detainee without providing
even minimal protections against self-incrimination. 75  At any time
during this period, the Home Minister, at the request of the police,
may require an inquiry and issue an order subjecting the accused to a
number of restrictions, including detention for a period of two years. 76
An "Advisory Board," appointed by the Home Minister, was given
some powers of review over these detentions,7 7 but this board in prac-
tice remains closely controlled by the Home Minister.
69. Dangerous Drugs (Amendment) Act, 1986, Act A659 (Malaysia), amending 1952
Act, supra note 1.
70. Id. § 39A.
71. ISA, supra note 12, § 8.
72. SPM Act, supra note 2, § 6(5)(b).
73. Id. §§ 3(1), 2(a).
74. Id. § 2(c).
75. Id. § 4.
76. Id. § 6(1)-(3).
77. Id. §§ 10-11. An example of how weak these procedural safeguards are and of the
Malaysian judiciary's unwillingness to intervene in these inquiries can be seen in Inspector
General of Police v. Rajoo s/o Ramasamy [1989] MALAYSIAN CURRENT L.J. 1039 (S.C.
Kuala Lumpur 1988). The defendant alleged that the Inquiry Officer did not sufficiently inves-
tigate the evidence suggesting that defendant was a drug trafficker. The Supreme Court held
that the legislature had not specifically required the inquiry officer to meet any particular
investigatory standards in making his report. Id. at 1042-43. Rajoo was subsequently released,
however, on a writ of habeas corpus on an issue involving the ISA Advisory Board's failure to
make a representation to the government within the statutory three month period. Star, Feb.
8, 1990, at 7.
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These measures were controversial because they were an exten-
sion of anti-drug measures that had been used to detain opposition
party leaders in 198778 and, therefore, elicited opposition reaction in
Parliament. Nevertheless, a 1990 amendment to the SPM Act went
further, completely removing all detentions under the Act from judi-
cial review.79 This was accomplished by language prohibiting any
"action, suit, or any other legal proceeding from being brought, insti-
tuted, or maintained in respect of any detention order."80 The
amendment sent the Malaysian judiciary a message not to interfere
with the executive's strong anti-drug measures.81 More importantly,
it barred all writs of habeas corpus.82
The government characterized the bill as simply preventing use
of a loophole in the 1952 Act. 3 The "loophole" in question had
allowed courts, under writs of habeas corpus, to release prisoners held
past the expiration of their terms; that is, held without legal authority.
Such detention is a fundamental violation of due process. Abolishing
judicial review of extended detention does not "plug" a loophole.
Rather, it is an act that changes the very structure of the rule of law in
Malaysia.
C. Other Laws Aimed at Drug Trafficking
The Dangerous Drugs (Forfeiture of Property) Act 1988 (Forfei-
ture of Property Act), 4 which permits the seizure of property
involved in drug trafficking, gives the state powerful civil weapons
against the commercial bases of the drug trade. It is aimed at the
huge profits amassed by large-scale drug dealers who are often
immune from arrest because they are never found near any drug
transactions.
78. C. MUZAFFAR, FREEDOM IN FETTERS: AN ANALYSIS OF THE STATE OF DEMOC-
RACY IN MALAYSIA (1986). The measures were used again in 1987 to detain 119 government
critics. CARPA, supra note 13, at 16.
79. Bill Seeks to Plug Loopholes in Drugs Act, Star, Mar. 6, 1990, at 4.
80. Id.
81. Coupled with the firing of the Lord President and two Supreme Court judges in
1988, the SPM Act cast a chill on judicial independence in Malaysia. Bill to Ensure Traffickers
Remain Under Detention, NST, Mar. 6, 1990, at 1.
82. The writ had been used with some success by detainees under the SPM Act. For
example, although the SPM Act specifies a two-year maximum period of detention, persons
held under detention orders of more than two years were released by the courts on writs of
habeas corpus. High Court Frees Four on Drug Charge, Star, Dec. 21, 1989, at 4. Tractor
Driver on Drug Charge Freed, Star, Jan. 24, 1990, at 10. For a Supreme Court case releasing
one of the drug detainees under one such "loophole" see Tan Hoon Seng v. Minister of Home
Affairs, Malaysia [1990] MALAYAN L.J. 171 (S.C. Kuala Lumpur 1989).
83. See Bill Seeks to Plug Loopholes in Drugs Act, supra note 79.
84. Dangerous Drugs (Forfeiture of Property) Act, 1988, Act 340 (Malaysia).
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However, the Forfeiture of Property Act is troublesome insofar
as it presumes the guilt of the alleged trafficker and the illegal nature
of the seized property. 5 Additionally, it provides that "where the
Public Prosecutor or any senior police officer has obtained any docu-
ment or other evidence . . . ," such document will be admissible
"notwithstanding anything to the contrary in any written law."86
This provision not only limits judicial review, but effectively invites
the police to employ illegal methods of obtaining evidence. The Act
also includes a very broad definition of criminal conspiracy.87 As
under the 1952 Act, bail is denied to anyone charged under these
measures.88 Finally, the Drug Dependents (Treatment and Rehabili-
tation) Act of 1983 (Drug Dependents Act) allows addicts to be invol-
untary committed to treatment programs and detained for up to three
years.89 As noted above, such treatment of addicts is rarely effective
in curbing drug abuse.9°
IV. THE JURISPRUDENCE OF MANDATORY DEATH IN MALAYSIA
This section addresses the question of how Malaysia's very
strong arsenal of anti-drug laws has been applied by the Malaysian
judiciary.91 Analysis of this question has three distinct parts. The
85. Id. § 34.
86. Id. § 35.
87. Id. § 3. It prohibits as a conspiracy "entering into... any dealing in relation to any
property, or using or causing to be used any property--(a) with the intention of promoting,
managing, establishing, or carrying on any act... which constitutes a scheduled [criminal]
offense; or (b) with the intention of facilitating or assisting in the promotion, management,
establishment or carrying on of the act... referred to in paragraph (a)" carrying a penalty of
five to twenty years imprisonment. Id.
88. Id. § 57.
89. Drug Dependents Act, supra note 23, § 6(1)(a).
90. Teaching Rehabilitation Center Inmates Better Skills, supra note 23.
91. Judges in Malaysia, at all levels, are appointed by the King on the advice of the
Prime Minister (or, for Sessions Court judges, the Chief Justice) after required consultation
with certain other government officials. M. SUFFIAN, INTRODUCTION TO THE LEGAL SYSTEM
OF MALAYSIA 52-54 (1988). While the Malaysian judiciary is competent in the traditional
skills of judicial interpretation, it has recently become a weak judiciary, wary of the executive
branch of government, and willing to defer to the government on matters related to national
emergencies and internal security. Although the Federal Constitution guarantees judicial
independence, the judiciary is on clear notice to respect the power of the executive branch and
to avoid making critical comments on general matters of public policy in Malaysia. Long-
standing resentment between the two branches broke into open conflict and a full-scale consti-
tutional crisis in 1988, when the highest ranking judge in Malaysia, the Lord President, and
two other Supreme Court judges were dismissed because of their disagreement with govern-
ment regarding their handling of a politically controversial case. See P. WILLIAMS, JUDICIAL
MISCONDUCT (1990); S. ABAS, THE ROLE OF THE INDEPENDENT JUDICIARY (1988). A lead-
ing expert on Malaysian constitutional law has concluded that the removal of the judges was
not justified under Malaysian law. Trindade, The Removal of the Malaysian Judges, 106 LAW
Q. REv. 51 (1990).
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first recounts the development of a presumptive mandatory death pen-
alty in drug cases before the codification of the penalty in the 1952
Act. The second focuses on how the Malaysian courts have decided
the drug cases brought under the mandatory death penalty provisions
of section 39B. Finally, a third part treats a judicially-created defense
to prosecuting traffickers for addiction.
A. The Judicial Creation of the Presumptive Death Penalty
The mandatory death penalty was initially a de facto creation of
the judiciary rather than something that emanated from Parliament.
Parliament had imposed a choice between a life sentence and the
death penalty in the 1975 Act, but until 1980, the judiciary treated
this as a mandatory life sentence.92 However, in eight cases,93 handed
down between 198091 and 1985 by the Federal Court and its successor
the Supreme Court, the highest courts in Malaysia developed the doc-
trine that public policy mandated a presumptive death penalty for
drug trafficking under section 39B by imposing death sentences in
cases where lower courts had assigned life sentences.95
The first of these cases was Lo Hock Seng v. Public Prosecutor.96
Loh Hock Seng and Hong Hoo Chong were convicted in the High
Court of Penang, on charges of selling 1550 grams of heroin. Loh was
sentenced to life with seven strokes of whipping and Hong to life with
fourteen strokes of whipping. Both defendants appealed to the Fed-
eral Court.
In light of his several previous convictions for armed robbery,
theft, house breaking, and possession of heroin, Hong Hoo Chong's
sentence was increased to death, the first time in thirty-two years the
court had made such an enhancement. 97 Chief Justice Azlan Shah
wrote:
92. There are no reported cases between 1975 and 1980 in which traffickers were sen-
tenced to death.
93. In addition to the three cases discussed below, the other five cases are Public Prose-
cutor v. Oon Lai Hin [1985] MALAYAN L.. 66 (F.C. Kuala Lumpur 1984); Oo Leng Swee v.
Public Prosecutor [1981] MALAYAN L.J. 247; Public Prosecutor v. Mohamed Ismail [1984]
MALAYAN L.J. 134 (O.Cr.J. Penang 1983); Public Prosecutor v. Neoh Wan Kee [1985]
MALAYAN L.J. 368 (O.Cr.L Penang 1984); Public Prosecutor v. Tan Gong Wai [1985]
MALAYAN W. 355 (O.Cr.J. Penang 1984).
94. Malaysia's first execution for trafficking occurred in 1980. Weng Kwai, supra note
14, at 28.
95. This doctrine was imposed on the lower courts through the Supreme Court's power
to review sentences on the appeal of either party. See infra notes 99-102 and accompanying
text.
96. Loh Hock Seng v. Public Prosecutor [1980] MALAYAN L.J. 13 (F.C. Penang 1979).
97. Id. at 15.
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[I]n view of the current and continuing upsurgence of indul-
gence in dangerous and deleterious drugs ... we feel the
time has now come for some more vigorous element of
deterrence to be brought to bear upon those trafficking in
drugs... who are no less than engineers of evil and peddlers
of death .... [They] should know they are in for the pun-
ishment prescribed by law to fit the crime.98
High Court judges interpreted the holding narrowly and origi-
nally understood Lo Hock Seng to apply only to the most serious
cases, and then only in the absence of mitigating circumstances.99
However, subsequent Federal Court cases significantly expanded the
scope of the ruling. In Chang Liang Sang, °° for example, the Federal
Court stated:
[W]e would like to stress that in drug trafficking cases very
little allowance can be made for the circumstances of indi-
vidual offenders .... Other than in the most exceptional
circumstances, a sentence of death should be imposed follow-
ing a conviction for trafficking, in order to mark the gravity
of the offense, to emphasize public disapproval, to serve as a
warning to others, to punish the offenders, and most of all to
protect the public. 101
The full reasons for judicial creation of a presumptive death pen-
alty cannot be known. The doctrine appears to be largely the creation
of one powerful judge, Chief Justice Azlan Shah, now King of Malay-
sia.102 Perhaps he saw the reluctance of the judges to apply the statu-
tory option of the death penalty as failing to provide adequate
98. Id. at 14.
99. See, eg., Public Prosecutor v. Tan Hock Hai [1983] MALAYAN L.J. 163 (F.C. Kuala
Lumpur 1982).
100. Chang Liang Sang v. Public Prosecutor [1982] MALAYAN L.J. 231 (F.C. Kuala
Lumpur 1982).
101. Id. (emphasis added).
102. In the normal course of Malaysian politics the ranks of federal officers and the
hereditary rules are separate. The Malaysian King is elected by the country's nine hereditary
sultans from among their number to serve a five-year term as King. Although the King is a
constitutional monarch with no real role in government, he serves as head of Islamic religious
affairs in the federal territory and possesses substantial traditional authority.
Azlan Shah was fourth in the line of succession in a branch of the royal family of Perak
that ordinarily would not have been due to rotate into the Sultan of Perak's throne. Conse-
quently, he was educated in law in Great Britain, and began a long career in the Malaysian
judiciary. After serving as Chief Justice and Lord President, several deaths in the Perak royal
family caused him to ascend to the Sultan's throne. He became Sultan of Perak in 1984 and
was elected King of Malaysia in 1989. A Man of Vision, NST, Apr. 19, 1990, § 2, at 6 (a short
biography).
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deterrence policy in the face of an international drug threat. It is also
possible that the doctrine is the result of an activist judiciary, throt-
tled in other important issues, asserting its power to shape public
policy.
Parliamentary enactment of the mandatory death sentence
arguably grew out of the Federal Court's own inability to specify the
appropriate "exceptional circumstances" that would justify a life sen-
tence. In Public Prosecutor v. Saubin Beatrice,103 a French defendant
was arrested with 534 grams of heroin concealed in twenty-two plastic
bags in a secret compartment in her suitcase.I°4 She maintained that
she had no knowledge of the drugs because a Chinese friend, whom
she could not produce in court, had given her the suitcase. The trial
judge rejected this defense, found her guilty and sentenced her to
life.105 On appeal, the judge noted the heroin had a street value in
Europe of $1.2 million, cited the presumptive death sentence and
increased her sentence to death."' 6 On further appeal the Federal
Court, in an unpublished opinion, reduced her sentence to life because
of unstated "exceptional circumstances."' 117
It was impossible to determine what these circumstances were
and most Malaysians quickly assumed the reasons were those that
seemed obvious: white European women did not face a presumptive
death sentence while Malaysian men and women of all races did. The
Court has never again found such extenuating circumstances. In Pub-
lic Prosecutor v. Tan Hock Hai,l08 a High Court judge cited Saubin
Beatrice"'9 for the proposition that he could individualize his sentence
because of "extenuating circumstances." In Saubin Beatrice, a differ-
ent panel of the same Court stated that "a twenty-two year old foreign
female courier who trafficks in heroin takes the same risk and does so
at the same peril as a fifty-two year old local male counterpart, and
the sex, age and origin of the offender would appropriately be more a
matter for.., clemency."' 10 Nevertheless, the Federal Court in Tan
103. Public Prosecutor v. Saubin Beatrice [1983] MALAYAN L.J. 307 (O.Cr.J. Penang
1982).
104. Id. at 308.
105. Id. at 307.
106. Id. at 314-15.
107. The unreported opinion is discussed in Public Prosecutor v. Tan Hock Hai [1983]
MALAYAN L.J. 163, 164 (F.C. Kuala Lumpur 1982), and in Phillips, Criminal Law, 1983,
reprinted in SURVEY OF MALAYSIAN LAW 149-50 (V. Sinnaduvai ed. 1983).
108. Tan Hock Hai [1983] MALAYAN L.J. 163.
109. Public Prosecutor v. Saubin Beatrice [1983] MALAYAN L.J. 307 (O.Cr.J. Penang
1982).
110. Tan Hock Hai [1983] MALAYAN L.J. 163, 164. There is a constitutional clemency
process set forth in Part IV, article 42 of the Federal Constitution. FEDERAL CONsT. art. 42
(Malaysia). Each state has a Pardons Board consisting of the Attorney General of the Federa-
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Hock Hai still imposed the death sentence, denying the lower court
judge's finding of "exceptional circumstances""' on the grounds that
it was unable to determine what constituted specific "exceptional cir-
cumstances" within the meaning of Saubin Beatrice.12
The inconsistency in sentencing, in addition to the racial over-
tones of the Saubin Beatrice case, were the major impetus leading Par-
liament to codify the mandatory death penalty for traffickers.' 1 3 The
government's stated reason for legislating the mandatory death pen-
alty stressed the same deterrence and public policy bases that Justice
Azlan Shah first set out in Loh Hock Seng.14 However, Parliament's
codification deemed irrelevant the discretionary factors that a judge
might properly take into account in sentencing and reversed its 1975
legislation allowing judges to choose sentences in trafficking cases." 5
The mandatory death penalty for traffickers is very popular and
no longer presents a serious legal or political question within Malay-
sia. The Supreme Court upheld the law in Public Prosecutor v. Lau
Kee Hoo."6 Following long established commonwealth law-under
which many countries, including Malaysia, have mandatory death
penalties" -- and quoting a Singapore case upholding Singapore's
mandatory death penalty for trafficking,"" the Court took a straight-
tion, the Chief Minister of the State, and up to three other members appointed by the Sultan.
This board makes recommendations to the Sultan. This process is secret and entirely discre-
tionary, but it appears that a number of persons sentenced to death are ultimately pardoned.
The courts, however, have refused to intervene in the clemency process, holding it is entirely a
matter for the executive and the rulers. Karpal Singh v. Sultan of Selangor [1987] MALAY-
siAN CuRRENT L.J. 342 (H.C. Kuala Lumpur 1987). The High Court held that the matter of
pardons was non-justiciable and clearly within the discretion of the Sultan. Id. at 346.
111. Tan Hock Hai [1983] MALAYAN L.J. 163.
112. Id.
113. Phillips, supra note 107, at 151.
114. Majid, supra note 2, at 149.
115. Phillips, supra note 107, at 5, 22-23.
116. Public Prosecutor v. Lau Kee Hoo [1983] MALAYAN L.J. 157 (F.C. Kuala Lumpur
1982).
117. See supra notes 14-16 and accompanying text. Malaysia also had the death penalty
under its customary law. An account of a traditional execution (although ordered by the
British) can be found in . McNAIR, PERAK AND THE MALAYS 202-09 (1882). The British
brought their laws, which included the penalty of death by hanging, to Malaysia. An account
of the first British trial and execution in Selangor can be found in Harring, Send Six Copies of
the Penal Code: The Foundations of Colonial Law in Selangor, 1875-1880, INT'L J. OF THE
SOCIOLOGY OF LAW (forthcoming 1991). Even without the mandatory death sentences
imposed on traffickers, Malaysia has a large number of executions. During the eleven years
1970 through 1980, Malaysian courts sentenced 123 persons to death. Thirty-one were exe-
cuted. Of these executions, eleven were under the Malaysian Penal Code (most likely for mur-
der), seventeen under the ISA, two under the Firearms (Increased Penalties Act), and one for
drug trafficking.
118. Ong Ah Chuan [1981] MALAYAN L.J. 64 (P.C. London 1980). This Singapore case
was appealed to the Privy Council of the House of Lords and is cited by the Malaysian
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forward positivist position: the matter of punishment for crimes is
exclusively for Parliament. 119 To the argument that this was "arbi-
trary," the court responded that all criminal classifications are, to a
certain extent, "arbitrary," and thus, are not necessarily unconstitu-
tional unless there is no basis justifying them.120
The death penalty is obviously intended to strike terror in the
hearts of traffickers and to deter them from doing business in drugs.
But it is also meant to terrorize the general population, not only
presenting drug use as the equivalent of death, but also presenting the
police and the state as omnipotent and fearsome. The image of the
mandatory death penalty looms very large in Malaysian legal culture.
Large posters with graphic images of hangman's nooses and slogans
"Dadah means Death" abound in Malaysia, while the headlines in the
popular press are replete with notices of death sentences.12 1
B. The Judicial Processing of Drug Trafficking Cases1 22
The development of the mandatory death penalty as the only
punishment for drug traffickers left judges with only one alternative to
Supreme Court. Singapore law is very influential in Malaysia because of the two countries'
common colonial heritage. Singapore, historically a part of Malaysia, but independent since
1964, also takes a strong stand against trafficking. The Singapore "Misuse of Drugs Act,"
chap. 185, Statutes of Singapore (1985), was originally drafted in 1973, replacing the 1952 Act
that is still in force in a modified form in Malaysia. The Singapore statute is much simpler
than the Malaysia statute. It provides a narrower definition of trafficking, lacks the presump-
tions of the Malaysia statute, and provides death in fewer drug related offenses, limiting that
penalty essentially to trafficking in over 30 grams of heroin or opium, or to the manufacture of
certain illegal drugs. Singapore has hanged twenty-six people under its anti-drug laws since
1975, compared to Malaysia's 104. However, with only about 15% of Malaysia's population,
Singapore has a higher per capita rate of drug executions. Tougher Drug Law to be Enforced,
Star, Feb. 10, 1990, at 18. On the general political climate in Singapore see ASIAWATCH,
SILENCING ALL CRITICS: HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS IN SINGAPORE (1990).
119. ASIAWATCH, supra note 118, at 161.
120. Id. at 161-162.
121. An article entitled Mother of Five to Hang for Trafficking in Heroin was accompa-
nied by a sad photograph of the trafficker in chains being led off to death row surrounded by a
large number of police officers. Mother of Five to Hang for Trafficking in Heroin, NST, Oct.
28, 1989, at 5.
122. The focus of the next sections is on major areas of judicial interpretation of the
various provisions of Malaysia's mandatory death penalty for traffickers. This may lead to an
impression that there is great judicial creativity in this area and that trafficking defendants
receive a high level of due process. While any analysis of comparative due process is a
complex matter (e.g., what is the actual level of due process in the average American case?), it
has already been represented that Malaysia has a highly competent judiciary, well schooled in
common law legal tradition, but conservative and positivistic in outlook. The following
sections discuss major problem areas in Malaysia's drug laws as developed by this judiciary. It
also follows that there are numerous areas of law where there are few problems and, in these
areas, routine cases easily lead to the mandatory death sentence. The routine administration of
section 39B in these cases can be expected to continue to lead to a high number of death
sentences as long as these severe drug laws remain on the books.
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imposing the death penalty-acquittal. Under Malaysian law this
decision falls solely to the judge-there is no right to trial by jury
except in murder cases. 
123
At the close of the prosecution's case, the judge must rule
whether the prosecution has introduced sufficient evidence for there
to be "cause to answer." If the judge is satisfied that the prosecution
has introduced sufficient evidence on every element of the case for
which it has the burden of proof, the judge then shifts the burden to
the defendant to show by a preponderance of the evidence that he or
she lacked knowledge about the drugs.124 Effectively, the defendant
must prove his innocence, a requirement that runs directly counter to
common law criminal jurisprudence.
Even though there is no statutory requirement that the defendant
have knowledge of the nature or location of the drugs at issue in order
to be convicted, 12 section 39B cases fall into a pattern in which
knowledge has become the major single issue.1 26 Persuasively denying
123. A description of the law of the criminal trial process can be found in M.K. MAIiD,
supra note 50, at 213-38.
124. The burden upon the prosecution at the close of a case is analyzed in Ibrahim, The
Burden at the End of the Prosecution Case-Haw Tua Tau Revisited [1987] MALAYAN L.J.
ixx. Defendants who face the death penalty are provided with court appointed defense counsel
at public expense. Joseph, Rights of Accused-Law and Practice [1976] MALAYAN L.J. ii;
Singh, When Does the Right of an Arrested Person to Consult Counsel Under Article 5(3) of the
Federal Constitution Begin? [1973] MALAYAN L.J. xxi.
125. The Public Prosecutor has argued, unsuccessfully, that Parliament intended section
39B to be a strict liability offense, with no knowledge requirement, but the Malaysian courts
have uniformly rejected this interpretation, reading into the law a common law mens rea of
specific intent to traffic in drugs. Public Prosecutor v. Saubin Beatrice [1983] MALAYAN LJ at
307, 313. A presumption of knowledge from possession also appears in section 37(d) of the
1952 Act. It follows that if Parliament intended section 39B to be a strict liability offense it did
not need the presumption of knowledge from possession in section 37(d). In Public Prosecutor
v. Gob Yeong Hock [1988] MALAYSIAN CuRRENT L.J. 185, (H.C. Kuala Lumpur 1987), the
trial judge specifically concludes that the Gohs' defense of "no knowledge" has been estab-
lished on a "balance of probabilities" rebutting the presumption of knowledge of section 37(d).
Id. at 196.
126. This section is based on a study of all section 39B cases reported in either the
Malayan Law Journal or the Malaysian Current Law Journal, the two official Malaysian
reporters. Both report selectively. While cases from all courts are occasionally reported, even
Supreme Court opinions are printed only on a selective basis. The ordinary judgements of
High Court judges are sometimes printed, while those of Sessions Court judges are rarely
printed. Since the mandatory death penalty provision was added in 1983, Sessions Courts have
not had jurisdiction over new section 39B cases because they are not empowered to pass the
sentence of death. Public Prosecutor v. Hun Peng Khai [1984] MALAYAN L.J. 318 (R.Cr.J.
Penang 1984). There were a number of cases dealing with Sessions Court section 39B cases
following the enactment of the mandatory death penalty provisions. Most of these cases were
disposed of in the Sessions Courts, thus saving the lives of many accused traffickers.
In all there are 122 reported section 39B cases, involving 150 defendants. Given the lack
of official statistics, it is impossible to determine what proportion of the total number of cases
brought this represents. There have been about 100 executions under section 39B and there are
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knowledge can lead to acquittal. As noted above, section 37 of the
1952 Act allows knowledge to be presumed in a number of circum-
stances.127 This section examines three such types of frequently
recurring circumstances: possession of drugs in hand-held bags of
various sorts, possession of drugs in the accused's houses or rooms,
and possession of drugs in automobiles.
A study of the functioning of the presumptions in section 37
demonstrates that they have been judicially restricted in several areas.
While the prosecution is often able to secure convictions without the
presumptions, ironically, the presumptions appear in some cases to
have weakened the prosecution's case by discouraging thorough
police investigations. On the other hand, the statutory presumptions
may be unjust insofar as they increase the possibility of wrongful con-
victions. This is the inevitable result of the prosecution not having to
satisfy the more rigid "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard of proof
and the defendant having the burden to prove a lack of knowledge.
1. Drugs Found in Bags
Even though section 37(d) specifically provides that a person
found in possession of a drug is "deemed to have known the nature of
such drug,"' 128 the courts have weakened this presumption by reinsert-
ing a fairly narrow knowledge requirement into the law. In Public
Prosecutor v. Goh Yeong Hock,1 29 Goh Yeong Hock and his wife were
arrested in December 1983 at Subang Airport, Kuala Lumpur and
charged with carrying 9,736.19 grams of heroin, one of Malaysia's
reportedly about 200 convicts on death row awaiting execution, making some 300 persons
convicted. There are no data on acquittals but my research shows that most pre-1986 cases
resulted in convictions, while the current conviction rate has dropped to about 40% acquittals.
This would suggest that there have been perhaps 400 section 39B trials, of which 30% have
been analyzed in this section. In any case, this discussion does not purport to provide a study
of all the cases but means instead to study a representative sampling.
There is a time-lag in the processing of section 39B cases of up to four or five years for
initial trial, then another three or four years for an appeal. Under the Malaysian Constitution,
the 1983 mandatory death penalty is not retroactive. Thus, cases are still being tried in which
the accused does not face the mandatory death penalty, but rather faces the presumptive death
sentence policy of Loh Hock Seng, supra note 96, and some cases of persons arrested before
April 1983 (and perhaps tried in 1987 or 1988) are still on appeal. Because of these cases, the
Supreme Court will continue to have to set standards to determine which traffickers should
receive a life sentence. Here, as elsewhere, the process of Malaysian justice is slow.
127. See supra notes 52-61 and accompanying text.
128. 1952 Act, supra note 1, § 37(d).
129. Public Prosecutor v. Goh Yeong Hock [1988] MALAYSIAN CURRENT L.J. 185.
The two were arrested because of a coincidence that connected them to a large, international
heroin trafficking operation. Narcotics police had been told that three persons (not the two
accused) would be trafficking in heroin in new blue bags on a flight to London.
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largest seizures. 3 The Gohs' bags had false bottoms that contained
heroin, and the couple carried about $3,000 (US) in four different
currencies.1 31
The Public Prosecutor's case was straightforward. The trial
judge noted that, under the presumptions established by sections
37(d) and 37(da)(i) of the 1952 Act, the two had custody and control
of the drugs. He thus presumed knowledge. 132 The defendants
claimed that they believed they were smuggling counterfeit US dollars
to the United Kingdom, for which they were to be paid $5,000.133
The trial judge applied a "balance of probabilities" standard to
the couple's rebuttal of the presumptions, a standard that places a
higher burden on the defense. Describing one of the accused as a
"backboneless construction worker," the judge concluded that even
"on a balance of probabilities... the two accused did not know the
bags contained heroin" and acquitted. 134 Because Goh admittedly
believed that he was smuggling counterfeit money, thus establishing a
general "guilty mind" intent, the case also illustrates that the intent
requirement for trafficking is one of specific, and not merely general,
intent.
The courts have struggled to define the knowledge requirement.
In Public Prosecutor v. Badrulsham bin Baharom,135 the defendant
was arrested walking to work carrying a bag containing 770 rolls of
marijuana. He claimed that the bag belonged to a friend and that he
did not know the bag's contents. The defendant was heading for work
four hours early, could not explain why the friend had asked him to
get the bag, and was imprecise on other matters. The explanation
given by the defendant was inadequate to balance the probabilities in
his favor and he was convicted.1 36 Knowledge, the court held, in the
absence of an express admission by the accused, may properly be
determined through inference.13
The courts have interpreted the knowledge requirement more
strictly in other cases. In Public Prosecutor v. Moh'd. Nadzir bin
Moh'd.,138 the accused was riding as a passenger on a motorcycle that
130. Id. at 186.
131. Id. at 189-90.
132. Id. at 189-90.
133. Id. at 190.
134. Id. at 196.
135. Public Prosecutor v. Badrulsham bin Baharom [1988] MALAYAN L.J. 535 (O.Cr.J.
Ajor Setar 1987).
136. Id. at 590-93.
137. Id. at 589.
138. Public Prosecutor v. Moh'd. Nadzir bin Moh'd. [1988] MALAYAN LJ. 238 (H.C.
Kuala Lumpur 1988).
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was stopped for not having any lights.139 When the owner of the
motorcycle fled, the accused realized that the motorcyclist had given
him a package and suspected that it contained heroin."4 He threw
the package to the side but was seen by two police officers, who recov-
ered the package and found it to contain seventeen grams of heroin. 141
Although the accused had no witnesses on his behalf and could not
produce the alleged owner of the drugs, the trial judge acquitted on
the grounds that the evidence had overcome the presumption under
section 37(d) that the defendant knew the nature of the thing under
his control to be heroin.142 Merely "suspecting" or "believing" it to
be heroin was not "knowledge" sufficient to convict. Thus, the court
weakened the presumption of knowledge by accepting defendant's
lack of knowledge as a defense.
2. Drugs Found in Rooms and Houses
Section 37(g) states that "if any dangerous drug is found to be
concealed in any premises, it shall be presumed... that the said drug
is so concealed with the knowledge of the occupier of the prem-
ises." 143 This too is a potentially powerful tool for the prosecution. 144
However, judicially imposed requirements of exclusive occupation
and questions whether drugs were truly concealed limit the impact of
the presumption, aiding the "occupier" of a room or house.
Public Prosecutor v. Tan Seow Chuan145 illustrates the particular
difficulty caused by this presumption given the traditional Malaysian
custom of living in large extended-family units. Tan Seow Chuan, a
69-year-old opium addict, faced trafficking charges because police
found a considerable quantity of prepared and raw opium in a room
of his house, together with the apparatus to process raw opium, a
scale with traces of opium in its pan, and $3,305 in a locked box. 14
Seven adults lived in four different rooms in this house; all had access
to the room in which these items were found, but no one lived or slept
in the room.147 Since the accused was senile, had difficulty walking




142. Id. at 240.
143. 1952 Act, supra note 1, § 37(g).
144. No search and seizure issues have been raised in drug cases because Malaysia has no
exclusionary rule. See M.K. MAJID, supra note 50, at 43-56.
145. Public Prosecutor v. Tan Seow Chuan [1985] MALAYAN LJ. 318 (O.Cr.J. Ser-
emban 1984).
146. Id. at 319.
147. Id.
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"occupier" of the room and that, therefore, no statutory presumption
followed. 148 The term "occupier" was narrowly limited to the regular
occupant of the one small room in which the opium was processed.
Since no one lived in that room, the Public Prosecutor faced the
anomaly of having found an opium factory in a house occupied by
seven adults but being deprived of a defendant. 149
Another case held on appeal that a defendant caught in a house
with drugs who admitted to living in the house but denied knowledge
of the drugs should have been acquitted.150 The court said that
because "appellant was not in exclusive occupation of the kitchen,"
no presumption applied.'-" The requirement of "exclusive" occupa-
tion further restricts the operation of the presumption.'52
On the other hand, some courts have convicted even without
finding exclusive care and maintenance. In Rosyatimah bte Neza,15 3
when police raided defendant's room, they found a red bag containing
cannabis under her bed. When asked to whom the drugs belonged,
she named her boyfriend.'5 4 Evidence at trial clearly established that
many people had access to the suite of rooms: four women lived there,
each had a boyfriend, and the accused slept in the room with a
number of different men. The court found that, although many peo-
ple had access to the room, the defendant was presumptively in exclu-
sive occupation and that, under the presumption, she must be
convicted. 55 The court went on, however, to split legal hairs in order
to spare the defendant the death penalty and to convict her of posses-
sion only. The judge held that while the presumptions proved posses-
sion, he was satisfied that the defendant's testimony had rebutted the
presumption that she was trafficking.156 The judge may have been
moved to this ruling because a blood test showed defendant was not
148. Id. at 325.
149. Id.
150. Low Geok Yeok v. Public Prosecutor [1982] MALAYAN L.J. 346, 347-48 (S.C.
Penang 1980). See also Drugs: Three Freed but not Callgirl, Star, Feb. 9, 1990, at 7, and Self
Confessed Callgirl Freed on Drug Charge, NST, Feb. 10, 1990, at 7 (prostitute and customers
all acquitted because none had exclusive care or management of a hotel room from which the
prostitute worked).
151. Low Geok Yeok [1982] MALAYAN L.J. at 348.
152. The Court's holding of "exclusive" use limits the operation of the presumption in
cases where the occupancy is not "exclusive" such as in rooming houses and shared dwellings
- common means of housing in Malaysia.
153. Public Prosecutor v. Rosyatimah bte Neza [1989] MALAYAN L.J. 360 (H.C. Perak
1988).
154. Id. at 361.
155. Id. at 367.
156. Id. at 368.
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using drugs. Nevertheless, under the wording of the law, he was well
within his power to sentence her to death.
In Public Prosecutor v. Ahman bin Puteh,15 7 three defendants
were arrested in a police raid on a house they occupied. A bag con-
taining cannabis was found near a refrigerator in the rear of the
house. 158 The court held that under section 37(g)-the presumption
that the "occupier" of the premises has knowledge of drugs concealed
there-a finding that drugs were in plain view negates the possibility
they were concealed.159 The court thus acquitted the defendants.
This narrow construction, technically grounded in a strict interpreta-
tion of a penal statute, indicates the courts desire to narrow the scope
of the presumption.
3. Drugs Found in Automobiles
It is unclear whether Parliament ever intended that parallel pre-
sumptions for "premises" should exist for automobiles. There is no
specific presumption that the owner or person in care or management
of a car has knowledge of drugs found in the vehicle. There is a lim-
ited presumption in section 37(h), which states that when a dangerous
drug is found "concealed in any compartment specially constructed
for this purpose on any vehicle" it is presumed to have been concealed
with the knowledge of the owner. 16° However, at least one court
rejected an argument attempting to expand the general language of
section 37(d), which provides that any person having "in his custody
or under his control anything whatsoever containing any dangerous
drug" applies to motor vehicles.1 61 While conceding that "anything
whatsoever may have a wide import," the court held that it was quali-
fied and limited by the word "containing." 162 The court held that a
car cannot be a "container of drugs" because that "would twist and
overstretch" the language beyond its common usage.1 63 Thus, unless
the drugs are actually found in a specially constructed compartment,
the prosecution must fully prove traflicking in automobiles without
157. Public Prosecutor v. Ahman bin Puteh [1987] MALAYSIAN CuRRENT L.J. 488
(H.C. Kedah 1986).
158. Id. at 489.
159. Id. at 492.
160. 1952 Act, supra note 1, § 37(h).
161. Syed Ali bin Syed Abdul Hamid [1982] MALAYAN L.J. 132 (F.C. Kuala Lumpur
1981). Authorities stopped and searched Syed Ali's car in a prearranged ambush. Hidden
behind a backrest in the back seat were more than forty kilograms of raw opium. Appellant
and his wife both denied knowledge of the drugs. The prosecutor failed to convince the court
that the car constituted "anything containing" a drug under section 37(d).
162. Id. at 133-34.
163. Id.
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the aid of statutory presumptions. To date, no court has found any
car to be, or to have, a specially constructed compartment.
Furthermore, courts have rejected the argument that a car con-
stitutes "premises" under section 37(g). 164 "Premises" are defined to
include "conveyances" which, in turn, would include a "ship, train,
vehicle, aircraft, or any other means of transport by which goods can
be carried."'' 65 The holding that an automobile was either a "vehicle"
or "any other means of transport," which in turn allowed knowledge
to be presumed, was overturned in the Syed All case.166 The appellate
court applied instead the common meaning of the word "premises,"
and stated that all definitions in the 1952 Act must be interpreted in
context. Thus, the term "premises" was restricted by the phrase
"occupier of the premises" appearing in the same paragraph. 67 Since
it is against common usage to refer to the person in control of a car as
an "occupier," the court ruled that the legislature must have intended
to restrict the definition of "premises" to its ordinary and usual
meaning. 1
68
C. Addiction as a Defense Against Trafficking
The broad definition of "trafficking"-which includes "posses-
sion," "receiving," "storing," "keeping" and "giving"--contains no
exception for drug addicts. 69 Under this definition, addicts possess-
ing statutory minimum amounts of drugs could be considered traffick-
ers. However, the Malaysian courts have held that addicts who hold
drugs for their own personal use are guilty only of "possession," not
of "trafficking." Possession, under section 39A, may be punished by
life imprisonment, but it carries no death sentence.17 0
Lorraine Philis Cohen and her son Aaron, New Zealand nation-
als, were seized at the Penang Airport with 141 grams and 35 grams
of heroin respectively, hidden in their underwear. 17 1 Under the law,
these amounts would be enough to presume intent to tratfick.' 72 Both
testified that they were drug addicts and the drugs were for their own
164. 1952 Act, supra note 1, § 37(g).
165. Id.
166. Syed All bin Syed Abdul Hamid [1982] MALAYAN L.J. at 133-134.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. 1952 Act, supra note 1, § 2 (definition of trafficking).
170. Id. § 39B.
171. Cohen Lorraine Philis v. Public Prosecutor [1989] MALAYSiAN CURRENT L.J. 956
(S.C. Kuala Lumpur 1988).
172. See supra notes 53-54 and accompanying text.
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use.17 3 Ms. Cohen received the death penalty, her son life imprison-
ment, and both appealed to the Supreme Court.
The Public Prosecutor asserted that because the broad definition
of trafficking includes carrying and keeping, it was not open to the
judge to reduce the charge to possession. 174 The judge disagreed,
holding that "despite the wide definition of the word 'trafficking' in
the Act.. .the definition sounds artificial and not in accordance with
the ordinary meaning of the word 'trafficking.' "175 The court held
that the defense of "personal consumption" was available, contingent
upon the facts of each case.176 The Cohens were sentenced to life
imprisonment.
Similarly, in Public Prosecutor v. Abdul Kudus bin Japlus,17 7 the
court applied this defense to a man caught with more than 15 grams
of heroin, enough to earn him the death penalty. 7  The accused
claimed that half the heroin belonged to his brother, also an addict.
This claim reduced the amount in his possession to 8 grams. The
court convicted the defendant of possession only. 17 9
Since many drug transactions involve addicts, this judicially cre-
ated "addiction" defense should be raised in future cases. Moreover,
the court's willingness to narrow the statutory definition of trafficking
by referring to the "ordinary usage" of the word may well lead to
further judicial limitations on the broad "trafficking" definition.
V. JUDICIAL CONTROL OF THE POLICE INVESTIGATIVE PROCESS
Evidence for the cases against alleged traffickers is prepared by
Malaysia's formidable police apparatus.8 0 In addition to legal ques-
tions, judges also face questions of fact concerning the professional
responsibility, legality and honesty of underlying police investigative
work. Setting high evidentiary and police professionalism standards
for mandatory death cases makes sound legal and moral sense and
173. Cohen Lorraine Philis [1989] MALAYSIAN CURRENT L.J. 956, 957.
174. Id. at 959.
175. Id. at 959-60.
176. Id.
177. Public Prosecutor v. Abdul Kudus bin Japlus [1988] MALAYAN L.J. 310.
178. Id. at 311-13.
179. Id. at 317.
180. Malaysia is one of the most heavily policed societies in the world: in 1990 it had
80,000 police officers in a predominantly rural, conservative nation of 17,000,000 people.
Police Review, Star, Mar. 17, 1990, at 1. About 20,000 men are attached to the Malaysian
Police Field Forces (PFF), a paramilitary unit that had primary responsibility for fighting the
communist insurgents. This force was re-deployed to fight drugs in December 1989. Id. See
also PFF to Take on Smugglers and Dadah Traffickers, NST, Jan. 10, 1990, at 1.
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serves to offset some of the advantages that the varying presumptions
give police and prosecutors in presenting drug cases.
This section analyzes how the courts evaluate police evidence
and control the police investigative process. Four distinct areas of
judicial supervision of police activities are considered. The first is the
court's decision to receive "cautioned statements," that is, potentially
self-incriminating statements by defendants. The second examines
how the courts treat evidence from "agents provocateurs," police
officers or informers who traffic in drugs in order to gain evidence
against other traffickers. The third area inquires into the courts' regu-
lation of the integrity of police work in the gathering of evidence. The
fourth looks at how courts treat evidence of police misconduct in the
course of drug investigations.
These four areas of police conduct all require the Malaysian judi-
ciary to carefully scrutinize police testimony in criminal cases. These
problems of police misconduct reveal the danger of police
overzealousness and illegality in the prosecution of drug cases, espe-
cially where the police are constrained by formal legal rules of evi-
dence and due process. Such actions as the introduction into evidence
of statements taken from defendants by police officers who do not
speak the defendant's language181 suggest that many police officers do
not respect the rights of defendants. However, the cases below illus-
trate that the Malaysian judiciary sets high standards of police con-
duct in investigations, standards that judges consistently are willing to
enforce, even at the expense of having to sacrifice the convictions of
major traffickers.
A. Judicial Admission of Cautioned Statements
Cautioned statements are self-incriminating statements made by
a defendant to a police official after the defendant has been "cau-
tioned" concerning the legal impact of such statements. Under
Malaysian law no such statement is admissible unless it was made to a
senior officer under carefully controlled circumstances. 8 2 However,
prosecutions under the 1952 Act are excepted from this rule, and cau-
tioned statements are admissible when made (after arrest) to any
police or customs officer.
181. See, eg., Public Prosecutor v. Mohammed Zaki [1986] MALAYAN L.J. 305 (O.Cr.J.
Kota Bhafu 1983).
182. Mohan, Admissability and Use of Statements Made to Police Officers. A Re-exami-
nation, Part 1 [1976] MALAYAN L.J. xxxii; Mohan, Part 2 [1977] MALAYAN L.J. xxxiv; M.K.
MAJID, supra note 50, at 67-86.
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The law that generally regulates cautioned statements includes
specific safeguards to reduce the likelihood of abuse. The safeguards
regulating the quality of such statements are provided for by the same
law that regulates such statements and Malaysian courts are strict
about not admitting legally defective statements. Ordinarily, the
admissibility of cautioned statements is determined by the judge in
each case after an ex parte hearing or "mini-trial" out of the presence
of the jury. However, in Malaysian drug cases, the judge is the sole
trier of fact. Since the judge becomes fully aware of the contents of
the statement, a danger arises that he will be unconsciously influenced
by it in reaching his decision. Thus, the standards of admissibility
provide no protection.
The leading cautioned statement case is Krishnan v. Public Prose-
cutor 8 3 in which the Supreme Court reversed a death penalty convic-
tion and acquitted an admitted trafficker. Krishnan was approached
in front of his house by police and ran inside. The police gave chase,
caught him and conducted a search of the house. In an adjacent row-
house, connected to the defendant's home by an open door, they
found 237 packets of drugs. An officer asked Krishnan whether he
had more drugs. When Krishnan responded affirmatively, the officer
asked where. Krishnan pointed to the back of the house.'
4
The Supreme Court held that an arrest had taken place when the
officer chased Krishnan into the house, found the drugs and held
him. s -8 At this point the Criminal Procedure Code § 113(l)(a)(ii)
required the administration of a cautionary statement. No such state-
ment was administered. 1 6 The court wrote:
A person accused of one of the most serious crimes known
to our law is... entitled to equal protection before the law,
and one of those items of protection to which he is entitled is
that his guilt must be proved in accordance or in a manner
required by law."17
The Krishnan case thus establishes that the Supreme Court will
reverse and acquit traffickers whose procedural rights are violated by
the police. 88
183. Krishnan v. Public Prosecutor [1987] MALAYAN L.J. 292 (S.C. Kuala Lumpur
1984).
184. Id. at 294.
185. Id.
186. Id. at 294-95.
187. Id. at 295.
188. See, eg., Public Prosecutor v. Mohd. Fuzi bin War Teh [1989] MALAYSIAN CuR-
RENT L.J. 652, 653 (H.C. Kuala Lumpur 1989) where a trial judge held that a cautioned
statement "should not be merely a mechanical exercise of just reading to the accused person"
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Judicial stringency regarding cautioned statements has also been
applied to other police testimony about defendants' statements. In
Public Prosecutor v. Shaik Anwar bin Abdul Jail,18 9 the prosecution
sought to introduce police testimony that the defendant had admitted
drug trafficking at the time of his arrest.' 9° Under Malaysian law, a
spontaneous admission is not restricted by the rules governing cau-
tioned statements. Officers may testify to defendants' spontaneous
statements at the time of arrest. However in Shaik, the judge refused
to admit the police testimony, holding that statements made to police
officers should be clearly and carefully recorded and not
paraphrased. 191
Given the inherent dangers, both of involuntariness when
defendants are in police custody facing charges carrying a mandatory
death penalty and of deliberate police efforts to increase evidence in
weak cases, the courts need to be vigilant in determining whether to
admit a defendants' statements. Ironically, though, the existence of a
high judicial standard may pose a difficult problem for defendants
whose cautioned statements are admitted. Once the court has been
careful to admit only proper statements, there is a natural tendency to
believe them. Such defendants are almost invariably convicted.
A final issue raised by the use of cautioned statements involves
the level of judicial awareness that Malaysia is a multi-lingual, multi-
cultural nation.192  In Public Prosecutor v. Mohammed Zaki,
193
Mohammed gave a cautioned statement, but then denied it was made
voluntarily. The court conducted a trial within a trial to determine
the legality of the statement and held that the statement had not been
properly administered on several grounds. The defendant was hand-
cuffed to a chair, a circumstance which under Malaysian law belies
the "voluntariness" of the statement, and the police conceded that the
but that it should be carefully explained, including its consequences. In that case, the sole fact
that defendant was handcuffed rendered the statement involuntary. See also Tan Too Kia v.
Public Prosecutor [1980] MALAYAN L.. 187 (F.C. Kuala Lumpur 1980), in which a Federal
Court reversed the conviction of a defendant whose statement was beaten out of him on the
narrow holding that once voluntariness became an issue it was incumbent on the prosecutor to
call the police inspector who had allegedly led in the beating. Since the proof of the voluntari-
ness of the confession had to be made "beyond a reasonable doubt" the failure of this officer to
testify when he was readily available meant that the prosecution had failed to meet its burden.
189. Public Prosecutor v. Shaik Anwar bin Abdul Jal11, No. CR 58-7-86 (O.CrJ. Selan-
gor 1989) (unreported).
190. Id. at 2.
191. Id. at 5-6
192. More than ten languages are spoken in Malaysia: Malay, Thai, Tamil, Hindi, Eng-
lish, at least five Chinese dialects, and a number of tribal languages.
193. Public Prosecutor v. Mohammed Zald [1986] MALAYAN L.. 305 (O.Cr.J. Kota
Bhaur 1983).
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final version that they introduced in court was not in the "exact words
of the accused."' 194 Most damaging was the revelation that Moham-
med and the interrogating officers did not speak the same language.
Mohammed's first language was Thai, although he understood one
Malay language well enough to trade. 19  The Federal Court
addressed the same issue in dicta (after acquitting the defendant on
other grounds), in Tan Too Kia v. Public Prosecutor.96 The defen-
dant in that case spoke the Chinese Teochew dialect and claimed not
to understand the Hokkien dialect in which he had been interrogated.
The court stated that:
generally speaking it is desirable that a suspect be interro-
gated in a language in which he is at home; but we would
not go further by saying that if his mother tongue is
Teochew he must be interrogated only in Teochew .... To
do so would unnecessarily tie up the hands of the police in
remote parts of the country .... This is a multi-racial and
multi-lingual country, and we cannot shut our eyes to the
fact that many Malaysians have not one, but two mother
tongues, and while they are master of no particular lan-
guage, yet converse easily in several languages for every day
purposes .... In most cases a suspect is not being asked
about concepts and abstract ideas, to express which he needs
to be questioned and to speak in a language he is most at
home in; but about events and concrete things. About these
he may be questioned and is expected to give his own ver-
sion only in language of the kind ordinarily used in the
bazaar.
197
While this holding attempts to deal pragmatically with the difficulties
Malaysian police face in a multi-lingual society, to equate the level of
understanding necessary for a criminal investigation with that which
suffices in a bazaar can only be offensive to notions of due process. A
criminal defendant's rights are "concepts and abstract ideas" that
deserve a higher level of consideration in the context of an
interrogation.
194. Id. at 307.
195. Id.
196. Tan Too Kia v. Public Prosecutor [1980] MALAYAN L.J. 187 (F.C. Kuala Lumpur
1979).
197. Id. at 188.
1991]
COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW
B. Judicial Supervision of Agents Provocateurs
The practice of using agents provocateurs-police agents who
commit crimes in order to get others to do so as well-is dangerous
due to potential police overzealousness. 198 The 1952 Act, however,
states that testimony of an agent provocateur must be accepted with-
out corroboration on the same basis as that of any other witness. 199 It
also means that if the judge finds the testimony suspicious, he can
simply ignore it.2c° Despite the liberal provisions relating to their tes-
timony in the 1952 Act, agents provocateurs are used often in
Malaysia.
In general, Malaysian courts trust agents provocateurs, possibly
because they are used primarily in drug arrests, a type of case that
may involve a standard of police discipline above that of ordinary
cases.2"' In Public Prosecutor v. Padi bin Abdullah, 2  the defendant
was captured "red-handed" selling cannabis to an agent provocateur
who had alerted the police to the transaction. The exchange of money
and drugs was seen clearly by three police officers.203 The accused
claimed that the agent was carrying the drugs. The court asserted
that the agent's testimony was confirmed by the police officers and
sentenced the defendant to death.2c4
C. Judicial Supervision of the Integrity of Police
A number of drug traffickers have been acquitted due to the fail-
ure of the police to account properly for evidence (always drugs) from
the point of arrest to trial. The opinions on such "chain of evidence"
cases have been emphatic in their criticism of the quality of police
198. G. MARX, UNDERCOVER: POLICE SURVEILLANCE IN AMERICA (1988) analyzes
many of the problems posed by agents provocateurs.
199. 1952 Act, supra note 1, § 40A.
200. See, eg., Public Prosecutor v. Abu Bakar bin Abdul Malek Mohd. Yunus a/l
Sumania [1990] MALAYSIAN CURRENT L.J. 1179 (H.C. Kuala Lumpur 1990). Here the trial
court dismissed a Myanmarese citizen's drug trafficking charges on grounds that the testimony
of the agent provocateur was not believable. When the prosecution failed to produce other
witnesses, the defendant was acquitted. However, the man was rearrested under the SPM Act
as he left the courtroom following his acquittal. Given that the detainee was arrested in
November 1986, held without bail pending his trial, and will now be held for two years of
preventive detention, he will serve about six years in prison, in spite of his acquittal. Brief
Taste of Freedom for Myanmarese Businessman, NST, Feb. 10, 1990, at 5.
201. Because of the importance of drug cases in Malaysia, it is likely that police adminis-
trators assign a higher level of organization and direction to the investigation of such cases.
However, there has not been nor is there likely to be a study of how various kinds of police
investigations are directed. See supra note 2.
202. [1989] MALAYAN L.J. 60 (H.C. Labuan 1988).
203. Id. at 61.
204. Id.
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work, and have come from courts at all levels, including the Supreme
Court.
The major Supreme Court chain of evidence case is Teoh Hoe
Chye.20 5 Two defendants were arrested in a large-scale drug investi-
gation involving their sale of 1,608.7 grams of heroin to an undercover
agent. From the place of arrest, both defendants and the evidence
were taken to the office of one Superintendent Low, arriving there
about 5:20 p.m. Soon thereafter, Low handed the drugs to Superin-
tendent Lim. Lim locked the heroin in a cabinet and went to dinner,
not returning until 7:40 p.m. At that point a chemist arrived to con-
duct necessary tests on the drugs. The Supreme Court held that there
was a break in the chain of evidence which led to doubt about
whether the drugs introduced at trial were those drugs seized from
defendants.2 °6 How the drugs were transferred from Low to Lim,
what happened to the drugs during the two hour hiatus while Lim
was at dinner, and whether the drugs were consistently under lock
and key were considered to be critical, unanswered questions. The
court held that "where a doubt as to the identity of an exhibit arises, a
failure to adduce evidence to provide the necessary link in the chain of
evidence would be fatal to the prosecution case. °207
This holding has often been repeated in chain of evidence cases, a
number of which expose poor quality police investigatory practices.
The case of Sebastiano Pavone, an Australian, is illustrative.208
Although caught "red-handed" carrying 1105 grams of an off-white
substance, the defendant was acquitted because of a discrepancy in
testimony as to the nature of the substance, a break in the chain of
evidence, and a discrepancy regarding the amount of the substance.' 9
"The prosecution," wrote the judge, "did not get.., the chemist...
or anybody else to explain what appears to be a difference in opinion
of what that plastic packet contained. ' 210 The court blamed these
problems on "some pretty shoddy investigations on the part of the
police. ,211
While these cases show that the courts require careful adherence
to the rules of evidence in drug cases, a trivial error does not necessar-
205. Teoh Hoe Chye v. Public Prosecutor [1987] MALAYAN L.J. 220, 223 (S.C. Kuala
Lumpur 1986).
206. Id. at 229-30.
207. Id. at 230.
208. Pavone v. Public Prosecutor (No. 2) [1986] MALAYAN L.J. 423 (A.Cr.J. Penang
1985).
209. Id. at 424-26.
210. Id. at 425.
211. Id.
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ily lead to reversal. In Public Prosecutor v. Phon Nam,212 the Public
Prosecutor neglected the required procedural measure of serving a
copy of the chemist's report on the accused. Although the prosecutor
remembered the mistake and asked the judge for permission to re-
open his case to introduce the evidence, the trial judge denied the
motion, holding that the "Public Prosecutor must prove every ele-
ment of the case without the aid of the court. ' 213 The Supreme Court
reversed, holding that while the powers under section 405 of the
Criminal Procedure Code provide that a judge "may" admit fresh evi-
dence in the interests of justice, a judge "must admit fresh evidence
when it appears essential to the just decision of a case. "214
D. Judicial Control of Police Misconduct
Malaysia has a history of rough police behavior stemming from
its communist emergency.215  Charges of police abuse-violence
against drug suspects, frame-ups, and general misconduct of all
216thsorts-frequently arise in drug cases. While the Malaysian judici-
ary is willing to respond to such misconduct, much of it is beyond the
range of the courts because it either goes unseen or can only be testi-
fied to by discredited drug defendants.
The most insipid form of deviant police conduct involved in drug
law enforcement is the planting of drugs on arrested suspects when no
evidence is found in the course of searching them. The courts have
212. Public Prosecutor v. Phon Nam [1987] MALAYSIAN CuRRENT L.J. 299 (H.C.
Perak 1986).
213. Id.
214. Public Prosecutor v. Phon Nam [1989] MALAYSIAN CuRRENT L.J. 7 (S.C. Kuala
Lumpur 1988). See also Public Prosecutor v. Ong Tee [1983] MALAYAN L.J. 407 (A.Cr.J.
Seremban 1980). In Ong Tee, a trial judge's acquittal of a defendant on possession charges
because the chemist had testified that the drug was "heroin" and not "heroin within the defini-
tion of the Dangerous Drugs Act" was set aside on appeal. The court held that heroin was a
well-known substance and that the description given was adequate to make out a prima facie
case.
215. The ISA detainees of the October 1987 crackdown on the political opposition
reported dozens of abuses of citizens' rights on the part of the police, including both physical
and psychological abuse. The documentation of police abuse of ISA detainees is extensive.
See also CARPA, supra note 13, at 78-81. See generally INTERNATIONAL MSSION oF LAW-
YERS TO MALAYSIA: THE REPORT (1983).
216. The large number of officers who apparently cooperated in presenting the pejured
case raises serious questions of the widespread nature of police dishonesty in drug cases. In
general, police corruption seems to be very widespread in Malaysia. See, eg., Public Prosecu-
tor v. Mak Hing [1988] MALAYSIAN CURRENT L.J. 482 (H.C. Kuala Lumpur 1988), in which
the court acquitted the defendant after uncovering false testimony on the part of three officers
and a cover-up scheme by others to conceal the perjurer's testimony. See infra notes 217-224
and accompanying text.
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found this behavior common. In Public Prosecutor v. Mak Hing,217
the accused's version of his arrest was totally at odds with that of the
police. According to the police, the accused was "behaving in a suspi-
cious manner" while riding a motorcycle, and was stopped by three
officers. They seized a plastic bag from his hand containing forty-one
grams of heroin and morphine.21 8
In his defense, the defendant claimed to be searching for drugs
beside the road because someone had told him drugs were hidden
there. He said that the police searched him but found nothing on him
or in the area. After his arrest and removal to a police station, he was
driven back to the scene of the arrest, where the officers found a
plastic bag of drugs.219 Confused by inconsistent statements by the
police and the defendant as well as by the inability of the police to
produce their diary from the evening of defendant's arrest, the judge
acquitted the defendant.220
Courts are often reluctant to accuse police officers directly of
misconduct or dishonesty. Frequently, they simply allude to
problems of police dishonesty and decide in favor of the defendant on
other grounds. For example, in Gan Kee Tian,22' the police gave
three different versions of the process that had led to their finding
heroin in the defendant's house. The judge disposed of the case by
acquitting on the ground that the prosecution had failed to show that
the accused had "custody or control" of the heroin as required by
section 39(d), but made clear that the quality of the police evidence
was "far from satisfactory" and that he did not believe the police.222
As serious as the perjury cases are the repeated charges of police
brutality and physical violence against prisoners, whether perpetrated
out of anger or in order to force "cautioned statements." Charges of
police brutality are very difficult to prove because the victims lack
credibility.223 Most often, when the accused in a drug case raises an
issue of police brutality, the court does not take cognizance of it.
Judges have raised the issue, but usually only in the context of revers-
217. Public Prosecutor v. Mak Hing [1988] MALAYSIAN CURRENT W. 482 (H.C. Kuala
Lumpur 1988).
218. Id. at 484.
219. Id. at 485-86.
220. Id. at 486-90. See also Public Prosecutor v. Wong Kiew Meow [1989] MALAYSIAN
CURRENT L.J. 496 (H.C. Kuala Lumpur 1988) (judge held that the defendant was the victim
of an elaborate police trap set for another person).
221. Public Prosecutor v. Gan Kee Tian [1987] MALAYSIAN CURRENT L.J. 403 (H.C
Kuala Lumpur 1987).
222. Id. at 407.
223. However, such charges were successfully raised in Public Prosecutor v. Wong Moy
[1988] MALAYSIAN CURRENT L.J. 521, 530.
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hug a case or discharging a defendant on other grounds.22 4 However,
charges of police dishonesty are frequently raised in drug cases, often
because this is the only defense open to a suspect caught "red-
handed." That judges are willing to face such issues and have found
defendants' charges to be true bespeak the integrity of the judicial
system.
VI. A STATISTICAL VIEW OF THE DEATH PENALTY
The cases cited in this article illustrate the determination of a
conservative judiciary to apply common law standards of due process
to Parliament's mandatory death penalty for trafficking. After a five-
year period during which the judiciary led Parliament toward the
mandatory death policy, the judiciary now seems to be retreating
from that position. However, in absolute numbers, Malaysia's prose-
cutions and convictions under the death penalty are increasing. Since
1985 there have been more than 200 mandatory death sentences in
drug trafficking cases.225 At least 200 persons are on death row await-
ing execution.226
Since 1983, well over 2,000 people have faced section 39B
charges.22 7 In 1989 alone, 680 persons were arrested for trafficking
under section 39B.228 The Malaysian judiciary clearly faces an enor-
mously difficult problem in the processing of these cases, even without
confronting the moral questions posed by the death penalty. The
impact of this large number of cases on the legal process, however, is
not equally clear.
In the context of the continuing rise in trafficking arrests, it may
well be that no matter what kinds of interpretations of the statute
judges apply in processing these cases, death sentences will increase,
or at least will remain at a high level.229 On the other hand, there is
224. Out of the 122 cases considered here, the claim of excessive use of force was made in
12, or about 10%.
225. There were thirty-four death sentences in 1987, fifty-six in 1988, and forty-four in
the first ten months of 1989. There are no official reports of criminal justice statistics in
Malaysia. Sufficient statistics have been released to the press to permit a general picture of the
pattern of section 39B enforcement to emerge. See 44 Pushers Got Death This Year, NST,
Nov. 4, 1989, at 4; Big Money the Lure, Its Death When Caught, NST, Jan. 1, 1990, at 4; 59
Suspected Dadah Leaders Held in Kedah, NST, Nov. 5, 1989, at 6; 1,169 Held for Dadah Last
Year, NST, Jan. 18, 1990, at 3; 27 Foreigners Still in Death Row, NST, Jan. 18, 1990, at 3; At
the Eleventh Hour, ASIAWEEK, supra note 32.
226. Winning Edge in War Against Dadah, NST, June 28, 1990, at 9.
227. 59 Suspected Dadah Leaders Held in Kedah, supra note 225; 1,169 Held for Dadah
Last Year, supra note 225.
228. Rise in Number of Dadah Addicts Last Year, supra note 23.
229. This conclusion is based on the author's reading of 122 reported cases contained in
the Malayan Law Journal and the Malaysian Current Law Journal, all the § 39B cases offi-
[29:365
MALAYSIA'S MANDATORY DEATH PENALTY
evidence that the proportion of convictions under section 39B is
declining, from nearly 90% in reported cases in the mid-1980s to
about 60% by 1988 and 1989.230 Unless one is willing to assume-
wrongly, this author believes-that the quality of police evidence or
prosecutorial preparation has dropped, this decline can be due only to
the unwillingness of judges to convict defendants under charges lead-
ing to mandatory death sentences. Analyzing reported cases for the
entire period since section 39B was adopted in 1975, we see the results
in Table I.
In 1987 the number of acquittals rose sharply, while the number
of convictions remained the same, causing the conviction rate to drop
to 61% from 78%. The conviction rate stood at 60% in 1988, then
fell to 56% in 1989. In 1989, appellate judges reduced a mandatory
death sentence to life for the first time since 1983231 (the year the
death sentence became mandatory), and began creating common law
exceptions to the mandatory death sentence.232
Charges are also being dropped by the police more frequently.
There were 680 section 39B arrests in 1989 but only 44 convictions in
the first ten months of the year.33 It seems that the police are arrest-
ing at least ten times the number of people they ultimately try. In
addition to judicial reluctance to apply the death penalty, it is possible
there is a deliberate police policy of over-arresting people on section
39B charges, perhaps because people who are arrested can be helpful
in other investigations.234 It is also possible that the large proportion
of acquittals has induced the police or Public Prosecutor to drop
many cases before trial.
As matters stand, the government has not publicly criticized the
judiciary's processing of section 39B cases, a circumstance that sug-
gests some balance has been struck. However, the fact that the judici-
ary has not been the object of criticism by the executive for its
handling of drug cases may signify either that the judiciary has read
dially reported since 1975 when the death penalty became mandatory. See supra note 126.
Moreover, under the SPM Act, supra note 2, which is beyond the scope of judicial review, 579
persons were detained in 1987 and 837 in 1988. 44 Pushers Got Death This Year, supra note
225.
230. These figures come from statistics compiled by the author.
231. Trafficker Escapes the Gallows, NST, Jan. 4, 1990, at 4.
232. This judicial remedy is inconsistent with the court's earlier policy statements justify-
ing the mandatory death penalty. See supra notes 92-121 and accompanying text.
233. The sources of these data are cited in supra note 225. In the United States, by way
of contrast, on the average about 50% of those charged are brought to trial, although this
figure is undoubtedly lower in drug arrests. See supra note 47.
234. There is no plea bargaining allowed for under § 39B but it seems that in practice
some charges are reduced to possession in exchange for testimony. No actual statistics are
available. See supra note 2.
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TABLE I














































* 39B Drug Trafficking cases reported in either Malayan Law Journal or the Current Law
Journal. Listed by year of reporting. Cases appearing in different courts are listed only
once, at the time of final disposition.
** Includes all 39B cases reported. Although the Act became law in 1975, no cases were
reported until 1979.
The disposition of each offender is recorded in all cases with multiple offenders. Thus,
the total number of offenders is higher than the total number of cases.
* Procedural disposition covers cases in which no judgment of guilt or innocence is
entered. Most of these cases involved either right to ball or removal from Sessions Court






2 life, one death
5 life, 3 death
one life, one death
5 life, 13 death
life, red. to 3
1 life, 10 death
11 death
18 death
1 reduced from death
to lesser off.
18 death
3 reduced to poss.
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the political winds carefully or that it has been too cautious in trying
and reviewing dangerous drug cases. It is also possible that the gov-
ernment simply does not object to a large number of acquittals and
reversals in drug cases; while it is committed to the idea of a"mandatory" death penalty for traffickers, surely the specter of hun-
dreds of executions a year is not the kind of international image that
Malaysia really wants.
Thus, the existing legal arrangement is functional. As it is easy
for the police to arrest and detain more than 1,000 people a year on
trafficking charges, the police gain an effective investigative tool as
well as a law capable of inflicting a great deal of fear in the drug
community. Later, a well-developed system of judicial review sifts
these cases down to 60 to 70 death sentences. Finally, after more
years of convicts waiting in jail, an appeals process filters this number
down still further.235
Whether this system serves as an effective deterrent is a critical
question236 with both a domestic and international component. As
previously stated, Malaysia has a serious internal drug problem, with
one of the world's highest rates of drug use.237 Based on official statis-
tics, Malaysia's rate of drug addiction has increased since 1975.238
There is, therefore, little evidence that section 39B has had a demon-
strable effect on drug use in Malaysia.
A major impetus to the provision of the mandatory death penalty
for trafficking was to rid Malaysia of foreigners using Malaysia, par-
235. Similarly, Hay, Property, Authority and Criminal Law, reprinted in D. HAY,
ALBION'S FATAL TREE 17 (1975), argues that the seventeenth century British law's promise of
severe punishment, coupled with frequent use of mercy, served to legitimate an authoritarian
legal system.
236. There is now much literature on deterrence in America, often cited in American
death penalty cases. See, e.g., Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 345-54 (1972) (dissenting
opinion); Ehrlich, The Deterrent Effect of Capital Punishment: A Question of Life and Death,
65 AM. ECON. REv. 397 (1975), makes the strongest case for the death penalty as a deterrent.
Whether such literature has any relevance to Malaysia's vastly different culture is an open
question.
237. See supra notes 22-25 and accompanying text. Mandatory urine testing of represen-
tative populations shows the incidence of drug use to be very high. For example, random tests
of 350 government servants in Penang in December 1989 and January 1990 found 22 using
drugs (6.2%). The individuals, mostly clerks, were committed to drug rehabilitative centers
for two years. 22 Civil Servants Fail Urine Tests for Drugs in Penang, Star, Mar. 18, 1990, at 7.
A similar random test of 5,500 police officers (about 7% of the force) found 21 to be using
drugs (0.04%). Hanniff: 21 Cops Hooked on Dadah, NST, Jan. 7, 1990 at 5. Note, however,
that the police tested were all from a remote and traditional area of the country (the East
Coast), while the clerks were from Malaysia's second largest city, a major drug center.
238. For a study of drug use patterns in Malaysia, see generally R. LEE, THE SOCIAL
PROCESSES OF DRUG USE AND REHABILITATION IN MALAYSIA (1986); Rise in Number of
Dadah Addicts Last Year, supra note 23; Addicts Spend $900 Million on Dadah, supra note 22.
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ticularly Penang, as a trafficking center.239 Since 1983, twenty-five
foreigners have been executed for trafficking in Malaysia.2' Cur-
rently, twenty-seven foreigners are awaiting execution. 241 Whether
there has been a deterrent at all to foreigners trafficking drugs,
whether Malaysia's drug laws have been the deterrent, or whether
foreigners simply find Thailand-which has better international air
connections than Malaysia as well as substantial corruption, and is
part of the Golden Triangle-a more convenient trafficking center24 2
are all unanswered questions.
VII. CONCLUSION
Drug penalty cases increasingly have come to define the criminal
law in Malaysia. Drug cases now provide many of the common law
precedents that define Malaysian criminal law. These precedents,
however, weaken the integrity of the law since judges seem to contrive
surreptitious devices to save the lives of individuals they feel are
wrongly accused or do not deserve death. At the same time, there is
no question that the judges have made more principled attempts to
provide a measure of due process for section 39B defendants. The
courts have been creative in providing effective controls over the
potential for injustice in the process of mandatory death trials. The
high level of acquittals speaks to the integrity of the judicial process.
In fact, it is clear that Malaysia's "mandatory death penalty for traf-
ficking" is, in reality, not mandatory because so many trafficking
arrests lead to dispositions other than the death penalty.
The judiciary has developed a number of legal devices that
remove from defendants the threat of mandatory death by hanging,
for example, by finding defendants guilty of "possession" but not of
trafficking. As the process works out, the state gets its perceived
deterrent benefit of the threat of mandatory death, but is spared both
much of the difficulty of administering it and the international embar-
rassment of too many executions. This outcome might explain why
239. MALAYSIAN FEDERAL DEPARTMENT OF INFORMATION, MALAYSIA'S STAND ON
DRUG ABUSE WELL ACCEPTED (1987).
240. Three of these have been Westerners, two Australians and one Briton. Eight have
been from Hong Kong, six have been Singaporean, three Thai, three Filipino, and two Indone-
sian, indicating a pattern of importation of drugs into Malaysia for domestic or regional use.
The Noose for an American? NEWSWEEK, supra note 8. A graphic drawing featuring a hang-
man's noose, a prison cell and the number of foreigners hanged for trafficking appeared under
the heading Dadah Doesn't Pay, NST, Feb. 6, 1990, at 1.
241. Only one of these is a Westerner, a New Zealand national. 27 Foreigners Still in
Death Row, NST, Jan. 18, 1990, at 3.
242. Southeast Asia is Now No. 1 Source of U.S. Heroin, NST, supra note 25; Traffickers
Blaze Trail Through China, NST, April 17, 1990, at 10.
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the government has not attacked the judiciary for the high level of
acquittals and yet, at the same time, has reacted strongly to judicial
review of SPM Act cases. The government may care more about its
emergency detention powers, which allow it to detain numerous
alleged traffickers, than about the number of death sentences carried
out.
The actual data on Malaysia's operation of its mandatory death
penalty for drug traffickers demonstrate that Malaysia's solution to
the drug problem is not effective, nor is it one that other countries
should emulate. While it is impossible to say what would have hap-
pened in Malaysia without the enactment of section 39B, domestic
drug use remains at the high levels it reached before the enactment of
the mandatory death penalty. Malaysia's experience demonstrates
the application of a "drug war" model to the drug problem. In spite
of draconian measures-including over a hundred executions, hun-
dreds of death penalties imposed, the conversion of a huge paramili-
tary police force from fighting communists to fighting drugs,
emergency trial processes that circumvent many due process protec-
tions, and a police force unfettered by search warrants-hundreds of
thousands of Malaysians are still dependent on drugs, and tens of
thousands of Malaysians are trafficking in drugs to meet those needs.
Drug wars, like many other wars, originate in failed social and
political policy. Drug use is deeply rooted in social problems.
Addressing the causes of these problems is distinct from conducting a
drug war to combat their manifestations. Malaysia has been unable to
investigate and counter the causes of drug use, as has the United
States and most other countries. However, the lesson of Malaysia's
failed war on drugs is that other approaches to drug problems should
be tried because sanctioned state violence under the rubric of a
mandatory death penalty does not solve the problem.
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